

Essays
Regarding
Controversies
Arising from Military Actions in the Western Theaters
of
The War of 1812



John Eric Vining
2018

Essays

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Introduction

This collection of essays arose from my attendance at a series of speeches presented by academic historians and historical authors, occurring in January, March, and June of 2018. The presentations revolved around the subjects of the prosecution of the War of 1812 in the Northwestern and Southwestern Theaters, the importance of forts to the prosecution of the War in the Northwestern Theater, and the practicing of psychological warfare in the Indian Wars of the Old Northwest. During these presentations, the academics made what I considered to be definitive statements regarding certain aspects of the War of 1812. I disagreed with several of these conclusory statements, as I held a different view on these subjects. At the very least, I felt there was room for debate of different positions on certain of the statements that had been presented as established facts. At that point, I had studied the War of 1812 for just over 50 years, including quite intensive study since 1991, and I felt my positions had merit. I determined to establish dialogs with these academicians to debate the issues. These debates continued throughout the first nine months of 2018. Five of the essays contained in this compendium (Essays 2 through 6) relate directly to those conversations:

Essay # 2: “What was the reason the war was pursued in the Northwestern Theater of the War of 1812?”

Essay # 3: “What was the relative importance of the long rifle to the United States’ war efforts in the Northwestern and Southwestern Theaters of the War of 1812?”

Essay # 4: “How important was the contribution of the Baratarian Pirates - their arms (especially cannons), supplies, and physical participation – to the American victory in the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812?”

Essay # 5: “Who was the greatest American general to emerge from the War of 1812?”

Essay # 6: “The Importance of Forts to the Trans-Appalachian West, 1777-1814.” Although this essay includes more than just fortification efforts in the western theaters of the War of 1812, I feel a significant portion of its content has a great bearing on the prosecution of the War of 1812 in the Northwest and Southwest Theaters.

Essay # 7: “An examination of Harrison’s campaign in Ohio and Indiana against Native Americans in the Fall of 1812,” was the result of research I completed as a direct result of my debates with the academic historians. I have not been able to find any research paper or book that examines this topic in depth. Therefore, I feel that this may be newly compiled historical information which you might find informative and interesting.

Essay # 8: “The Battle of Mississinewa: A Battle in a Major Western Campaign in the War of 1812,” is an essay that was previously included as an appendix to my earlier book, *“The Trans-Appalachian Wars, 1790-1818: Pathways to America’s First Empire”* (Trafford Publishing, 2010). It is included in this compendium because its content amplifies an understanding of perhaps the largest battle of Harrison’s Autumn 1812 campaign, a campaign which is discussed in Essay # 7.

Essay # 9: “The War of 1812 Service of Major General John E. Wool, 1784-1869” is both a contraction and an expansion of a previous essay I had published in my book, *“Tales of the Midwest: Growing up and Growing Old in Rural Small-town, USA”* (Trafford Publishing, 2015). The revised essay is a contraction in the sense that I limited the content to Wool’s service in the War of 1812. It is an expansion in that I added more facts about Wool’s War of 1812 service to this particular essay. Here is an interesting aspect about the genesis of the original essay: In the 1980s and 1990s, as I was reading 19th Century American military history, the name of American officer “John E. Wool” popped up at the margins of many battles and campaigns. The War of 1812...the Indian Wars...the Mexican-American War...the Civil War... John Ellis Wool kept appearing at the edges of so many operations. I finally did some research and completed an essay on his military career because I could not recall anyone who had played a part in so much military history, over so many years, yet remained so unknown. I included the revised essay with this compendium basically as a bonus for your information and hopefully your reading pleasure.

In the midst of the debates discussed in Essays 2 through 6, one of the academicians said, “And keep in mind that on the...issues you raised, honest scholars can disagree.” I think you will find this statement validated as you read these discussions. This academician suggested that I discuss these topics in a second edition of *The Trans-Appalachian Wars, 1790-1818*. Since a second edition did not seem to be in the offing, I thought this on-line compendium of essays might be a good alternative for laying out the arguments.

I freely note that this collection of essays would not pass a formal academic review process. The very nature of the war on the rugged Old Northwest frontier, peopled by illiterate or scarcely literate settlers on one side, and Native Americans who utilized the spoken word – passed down through generations – on the other, militates against having the kind of written documentation that would make a rigorous academic review possible. Intelligent, relatively educated (for the time) commentators who were eyewitnesses to history were in short supply during that period: there were few Robert Breckinridge McAfee’s, William Atherton’s, or John Tipton’s serving the ranks of the various western armies. However, every effort has been made to make these essays as accurate as possible, utilizing available documentation. Eyewitness accounts like McAfee’s, Tipton’s, and others; second generation accounts like Benson J. Lossing’s (who interviewed many eyewitnesses to the actions of the War of 1812 in the mid-Nineteenth Century) plus other like publications; old and new scholarship; and even historical markers were consulted to produce essays on a slice of history that is in danger of being lost. This compendium should be considered a starting point, not a conclusion, to the discussion of controversies arising from the conduct of the War of 1812 in the Old Northwest and Old Southwest.

Finally, if you have begun this pamphlet looking for a “light Sunday afternoon read,” you may wish to reconsider how you will spend the next few hours. In debating scholars over the years, I have learned that you must have facts and figures in line or you will be eaten alive (and at times, you can feel that way even if the facts and figures favor your argument!). Thus, these essays sometimes “get into the weeds,” and there are fair amounts of footnoted facts, figures, distances, and performance statistics included. This is one of the reasons I decided to make this pamphlet free on my internet web site – fair warning!

Nevertheless, I wish to emphasize that the major reason for producing this online pamphlet is to stimulate historical thought and debate on the War of 1812 – a war that is increasingly considered (along with the Korean War, 1950-1953) as “the forgotten war.” I hope you find this collection of historical essays intellectually stimulating and interesting.

John Eric Vining

December, 2018

Essay # 1: A general discussion and explanation of John Eric Vining's theories on and methods of research

I am what is called in the vernacular a “popular historian,” perhaps an anathema to most “academic historians.” Until recently retired, I held down a full-time job as a business manager, so I was not able to spend time in archives with original documentation.

Thus, I proceed with secondary sources in many cases (although I read primary sources when these are readily available). This in turn leads to the necessity of using inductive reasoning (inherently based on probabilities). Since my training and profession is in business management, I am skilled in reaching “satisficing” decisions based on incomplete information and subsequent inductive reasoning. All of this is part-and-parcel of the management world, since managers virtually never have complete information.

That being said, in order to increase the probabilities of accuracy in researching history, I virtually always attempt to have (at least) three sources as I research historical subjects: one source with a copyright date as close to the event as possible; one source with a copyright date approximately 50 years or so after the event; and one or more sources with relatively current copyright dates (I won't go into a mundane defense of this methodology: suffice it to say that experience has shown that this method increases the probability of drawing accurate inferences from the nature of events).

In reality, I research history along three phases of thought, and each of these three phases has three levels of inquiry:

Phase I: The study of military history can be viewed as ascending along a continuum of the three levels of knowledge that define the historian's craft:

- 1) **Acquisition of the facts.** Who did what, when? Here the details matter and the historian is tasked with assembling and learning facts.
- 2) **Defining the flow of history.** What were the larger events that led to the larger decisions?
- 3) **Determining the grand theories of history and making high-level judgments about trends in history.** Why did events happen as they did?

Phase II: The pursuit of knowledge along the above continuum can be facilitated by using the following steps for “getting up to speed” on a topic:

- 1) Read a short three-to-five-page **summary** of the topic.
- 2) Read an eight-to-fifty-page **article** on the topic.
- 3) Read a **book** (or several books) on the topic.

Phase III: If the pursuit of the above levels of knowledge is combined with the study of the following categories or sources of information and/or documentation, the historian will be well on the way to acquiring a good understanding of the topic in question:

- 1) **Review of books and documentation with copyright dates as close to the occurrence of the event as possible.** Here the initial, fresh, perhaps first-person impressions of the event are documented.
- 2) **Review of books with copyright dates approximately mid-way between the event date and the present date.** Here broader perspectives granted by time are combined with more accurate facts and figures to present a more balanced view of the event.
- 3) **Review of books with relatively current copyright dates.** These will contain the most recent scholarship of the event, usually combined with a rigorous, heavily-reviewed, carefully-presented study of the source documentation in a flowing narrative format.

As an example of this methodology, in studying the contributions of cannons and the Baratarians Pirates to American successes in the Southwestern Theater of 1812, I chose for my oldest source "History of the Late War in the Western Country" by Robert Breckinridge McAfee (copyright 1816).

For the mid-dated books, I chose "Pictorial History of the War of 1812," by Benson Lossing (1869) and "Naval History of the War of 1812" by Theodore Roosevelt (1882).

For the recent sources, I chose (among others) "Encyclopedia of the War of 1812," (various essays/entries written by many authors), edited by Jeanne T. Heidler and David S. Heidler (1997), and three sources specific to the Battle of New Orleans: "The Battle of New Orleans," by Robert Remini (2001), as well as two articles: "'Decisive' Battle Follows Victory," by Joe D. Huddleston, Muzzle Blasts (1991) and "Old Hickory's Finest Hour," by Thomas Fleming, Great Battles: Monumental Clashes of the 19th Century, (2004).

Where possible, I have used two other techniques as I have gathered historical knowledge over the years. First, I have read historical military accounts written by the "other" side. (For example, I have read British accounts of the War of 1812 and German/Japanese histories of World War II). Second, I not only attempt to read what went "right" with battles and campaigns, but also what went "wrong" with them as well. (In business terminology, I have not only studied "best practices," but have also conducted "exception analysis.")

As you read the following essays, you can use the above description of methodology to envision how I reached the positions I espouse as I debated the issues.

Essay # 2: What was the reason the War was pursued in the Northwestern Theater of the War of 1812?

Academic position (paraphrased): The United States went to war with Great Britain over “neutral rights,” essentially over the impressment of ocean-going sailors of a neutral United States (in regard to the war between Great Britain and France) into the British Navy. The War in the Northwest was pursued to conquer Canada and add it to the United States. The defense of the Ohio, Indiana Territory, Michigan Territory, and other areas of the Northwest were not mentioned in the western newspapers of the time: their coverage was focused on neutral rights. The clauses regarding the ceasing of British influence and interference in the Northwest were included in the Treaty of Ghent (ending the War of 1812) essentially as an afterthought.

John Eric Vining’s position:

Among those familiar with the causes and activities of the War of 1812 in the Northwest, an interesting dichotomy exists. Some feel the pursuit of American war aims in the Old Northwest Territory was for the conquest of Canada. Some feel the effort was to secure the Old Northwest from British efforts to destabilize and perhaps reacquire this land mass. Still others feel that at the very least the campaign was an effort by the United States to prevent the British from pinning a robust and expanding America against the Atlantic Ocean and thus limiting it to a few small, weak coastal “quasicolonies.”

On the surface, the answer to these questions seems obvious and validated by subsequent 19th Century experiences. The battle cry “On to Canada” must certainly have indicated the first stirrings of America’s 19th Century “Manifest Destiny,” where a young and vibrant United States stormed forward and captured more and more land, in a relentless push toward the only barriers that would stop it: the seas and oceans surrounding the North American continent. No less an authority than Thomas Jefferson noted that conquering Canada would be “a mere matter of marching.”

This mindset of viewing the vast lands of Canada and the American Midwest as a source of wealth and power appears firmly entrenched in modern folklore. Consider the following exchange in the relatively recent movie *“The Patriot”* (2000), Paramount Pictures; Writer: Robert Rodat.

Director: Roland Emmerich):

British General Charles Cornwallis (speaking to British “Colonel Tavington” [the “Banastre Tarlton” character] regarding American militia officer “Colonel Benjamin Martin” [the “Francis Marion/Swamp Fox” character]): *“I want you to find that man...I want you to capture him!”* Colonel Tavington: *“The man has the loyalty of the people. They protect him...they protect his family... they protect the families of his men.”*

“I can capture him for you. But to do so requires the use of tactics that are somewhat...what is the term Your Lordship used? ‘Brutal,’ I think...”

General Cornwallis: *“Go on...”*

Colonel Tavington: *"I am prepared to do what is necessary. I alone will assume the full mantle of responsibility for my actions – free of the chain of command, rendering you blameless. However, if I do this, you and I both know that I can never return to England with honor. What, I wonder, is to become of me?"*

General Cornwallis, bending at the waist and examining a map: *"When this war is over here in the colonies, the new aristocracy will be land owners."*

Colonel Tavington, joining him at the map: *"Tell me about...Ohio..."*

It is easy to find support for the idea that the War of 1812 in the Northwestern Theater was all about the American conquest of Canada. For example, there was the influence of the "War Hawks," a group of relatively young congressmen (born in the mid-1770s and 1780s) from the rural South and West, who advocated war with Britain and adopted the slogan "On to Canada" as their watchword. This group included, but was not limited to:

- Henry Clay (Born 1777, from Kentucky)
- John C. Calhoun (1782, South Carolina)
- Richard Mentor Johnson (1780, Kentucky)
- William Lowndes (1782, South Carolina)
- Langdon Cheves (1776, South Carolina)
- Felix Grundy (1777, Tennessee)
- William W. Bibb (1781, Georgia)
- John J. Crittenden (younger [born 1787], from Kentucky, but associated by some with the War Hawks)

These men had little or no military experience (prior to the War of 1812) and were widely assumed to advocate war with Great Britain for the purpose of acquisition of additional territories for economic exploitation. They were very vocal in Congress, tended to vote as a bloc, and were politically influential far out of proportion to their relatively small numbers and meager legislative experience. Thus, it is easy to assume that their aims were representative of the attitudes of a majority of Southerners and Westerners in the 1809-1812 time period, immediately preceding the War of 1812.

But there was another, earlier generation of politician-soldiers present in Kentucky during the first two decades of the 1800s, with their collective hands firmly on the levers of power in that state. (As Kentucky supplied the majority of soldiers and supplies for the campaigns in Ohio, Indiana Territory, and Michigan Territory in the War of 1812, this group's attitudes and actions had huge impacts on the Northwestern campaign.) This group was characterized by being roughly 20 to 25+ years older than the average age of the War Hawks, was born on the Virginia – North Carolina – South Carolina frontier, and immigrated to Kentucky in the earliest stages of the opening of that area to settlement.

This group included: -Charles Scott (born 1739)

-Isaac Shelby (1750)

-John Adair (1757)

-William Russell (1758)

-William Henry Harrison (younger [born 1773], from Virginia, but associated with the established Kentucky power structure.)

These men had been involved early in the back-and-forth struggles with Native Americans on both sides of the Ohio River from 1778 onward. Indeed, all had commanded troops in various campaigns in the area north of the Ohio River for an extended number of years leading up to the War of 1812.

Charles Scott (1739-1813) served as a scout in the French and Indian War (1754-1763), rising through the ranks to become a captain in the Virginia Regiment by the end of the war. He returned to service in 1775 when the American Revolution began, was promoted to colonel in 1776, and was named to command the 5th Virginia Regiment. He served under Washington in the New Jersey and Philadelphia campaigns. Scott resettled in Versailles, Kentucky (then a territory under the control of Virginia) in 1787. When Indian raids from across the Ohio River began occurring with distressing regularity in northern Kentucky, he raised a company of volunteers, then served under General Harmar in operations north of the Ohio. Scott was elevated to the rank of brigadier general of the Kentucky militia and in 1791 conducted another raid into Indiana Territory, destroying the Native American village of Ouiatenon. Once again promoted, this time to major general, Scott led the Kentucky 2nd Division, in cooperation with Anthony Wayne, at the Battle of Fallen Timbers on August 20, 1794. From 1808 to 1812, he was governor of Kentucky, and much of his time was spent preparing Kentucky personnel and supplies for the soon-to-commence military operations in Indiana and Northern Ohio during the War of 1812.

Isaac Shelby's (1750-1826) military career began in 1774 in Lord Dunmore's War, where he served as second-in-command in his father's company at the bloody Battle of Point Pleasant. In 1780, during the Revolutionary War, he served as co-commander of American forces at the Battle of King's Mountain. Moving to Kentucky after the war, he became its first governor (1792-1796) when Kentucky was admitted as a state. One of his major tasks as governor was helping secure the state against Indian raids from north of the Ohio River. He worked with the state's political and military structures to do just that, providing crucial background support for several Kentucky militia raids into the Old Northwest Territory. Once again becoming Kentucky's governor (1812-1816) as Tecumseh's Confederacy strengthened and war with Great Britain loomed, he worked with retiring Governor Charles Scott to assure that William Henry Harrison became commander of Kentucky's militia forces in the coming conflict.

John Adair (1757-1840) served in the South Carolina state militia during the Revolutionary War, being captured twice and held as a prisoner-of-war by the British. He participated in the battles of Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, Camden, and as an officer (lieutenant) at Eutaw Springs. After the war, in 1786, he moved to Kentucky. During the Northwest Indian War, he commanded Kentucky troops at the Battle of

Fort St. Clair (1792), where several Kentuckians were killed. For his skill in this battle, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the Kentucky militia. He later assisted in the building of Fort Greeneville. Adair served in many command roles during the War of 1812, including being responsible for all Kentucky troops (as a brigadier general) at the Battle of New Orleans.

William Russell (1758-1825) was born in Culpepper County, Virginia. During the Revolutionary War, he fought as a captain in the Virginia militia and took part in the battle of Kings Mountain. He later served as a colonel of Kentucky militia during the Northwest Indian War. In the War of 1812, he served as colonel of the 7th Infantry Regiment. He was also associated with the Indiana Rangers.

William Henry Harrison (1773-1841) started his career by studying to be a doctor, but lack of both interest in this profession and the money required for the education moved him toward a military career. As a contemporary of Napoleon, he foreshadowed this great commander's dictum to study the successful strategies and tactics of earlier commanders and battles. Named ensign and attached to Major General Anthony Wayne's staff, he quickly proved his worth and became chief aide-de-camp to this outstanding general. As such, he became intimate with Wayne's plans and actions – being at the general's side in the victorious 1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers. Transitioning into the political field, he became Indiana Territorial Governor in 1801. In this capacity, he concluded many treaties with the Native American inhabitants of the territory, and secured a large part of Indiana for white settlement. Noting that this process provided the impetus for the rising Tecumseh's confederacy, he moved to forestall this confederacy's growth by marching to Tippecanoe, defeating confederacy forces, and destroying Prophet's Town. Harrison later played the key role in American successes in the Northwestern Theater of the War of 1812 as overall commander of American forces in the Northwest.

The key point to be made is that to these powerful men, the Northwest Territory was viewed not only as a land of economic opportunity. Their experience was that the landmass north of the Ohio River contained British trading posts that supplied the Native Americans with arms and ammunition with which to threaten Kentucky (Note the efforts to destroy trading posts north and west of Fort Wayne by Kentucky militia in the fall of 1812; related content on this topic is included in Essay # 7 of this compendium). It also contained multiple southward-flowing waterways that provided easy riverine passages to the northern tier of Kentucky counties (From east to west: the Muskingum, Hocking, Scioto, Little Miami, Great Miami, Whitewater, Blue, and Wabash Rivers.) It seems relatively easy to envision that in these men's minds, the 17-year interval between the Battle of Fallen Timbers (1794) and the Battle of Tippecanoe (1811) was not a peaceful interlude between two wars. Tippecanoe was simply the resumed manifestation of the frontier violence that they had combatted multiple times in past years, and which had been imperfectly concluded by the Treaty of Greene Ville.

If one needs further confirmation of this contention, one needs to carefully read some of the leading contemporary sources of information on the War of 1812 in the Northwestern Theater. Robert Breckinridge McAfee was a company commander in William Henry Harrison's army at the climactic Battle of the Thames in 1813. After the War, he wrote *"A History of the Late War in the Western Country"* (copyright 1816). As a soldier turned writer, McAfee's verbiage and inflection makes it very clear that the struggle in the Northwest was a war to end British influence there, push the Native Americans out of the Territory (preferably into Canada), and secure the Northwest Territory once-and-for-all for the United States. The great 19th Century historian Benson J. Lossing turned his attention to the War of 1812 in the late 1850s/early 1860s. He traveled to many of the sites of War of 1812 battles and interviewed many survivors of that war. Out of this activity came *"The Pictorial Field-book of the War of 1812"* (copyright 1869). Although he was not a participant in the War of 1812, Lossing spoke with many who were. Once again, the verbiage and inflection he imparts in this work makes it very clear that most of those people he interviewed regarding the Old Northwest felt the battles that were waged there were for the purpose of pushing the British and Indians into Canada and securing the Northwest for the United States.

One source maintains that a consequence of the War of 1812 that had a lasting effect on Kentucky was that the Shawnee never again challenged white control of the state.¹ Another notes that in a provision of the Treaty of Ghent ending the War of 1812, Great Britain agreed not to arm nor trade with American Indians in the United States.² Both these statements lend credence to the theory that many of the military actions in the Northwest were carried out to forestall hostile British and Indian activities in this theater.

However, I maintain that perhaps the strongest arguments for war in the Old Northwest being a robust "defensive/offensive" effort against British and Native Americans is encompassed by the following five points:

1) James Madison, the man who eventually asked Congress to declare a state of war between the United States and Great Britain, "insinuated that the British were also responsible for renewed Indian warfare on the frontier. Madison added: '*A warfare which is known to spare neither age nor sex and to be distinguished by features particularly shocking to humanity. It is difficult to account for the activity and combination which have for some time been developing themselves among tribes in constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons without connecting their hostility with that influence and without recollecting the authenticated examples of such impositions heretofore furnished by the officers and agents of that government.*'"³

2) The activation of the Indiana Rangers from 1807 to 1809, with a reactivation in 1812-1815. The Rangers were organized to provide fast response to attacks, primarily as a deterrent to random American Indian raids.⁴ The Rangers also (under William Russell) undertook offensive raids against Native American villages during the War of 1812. If there were no overriding concerns about Native American atrocities in

the Old Northwest, and the war there was basically a “Manifest Destiny-style” land grab, why the need for a relatively extensive offensive/defensive military organization such as the Indiana Rangers?

3) A series of “citizen forts” was established in 1812, starting at Cleveland, Ohio, arching through Columbus, through Dayton, then becoming a cordon across the lower quarters of both Indiana and Illinois. If the Indian depredations from the north were not considered a very serious threat, why the need for the extensive fortification effort on the part of the citizens? (Related information on this topic is included in the content of Essay # 6 of this compendium.)

4) A contemporary military/political thinker, Andrew Jackson, held the position that the best way to stabilize the Old Southwest was to remove foreign influences from the proximity of American Southern holdings. This was the impetus for his attacks on Spanish-held Pensacola (West Florida, 1814) and the thinly disguised attacks on the Seminoles in the questionably-named First Seminole War (in Spanish-held East Florida, 1817-1818). Could this same mindset have prevailed in the Old Northwest?

5) The military actions of William Henry Harrison, the American commander in the Northwest from September 1812 to late 1813, are very indicative of American war aims in the Northwest. Harrison parried three different British invasions of Ohio (west of Defiance on the Maumee River in 1812, Fort Meigs in May of 1813, and Fort Meigs/Fort Stephenson in July/August, 1813). Plus, he pursued a campaign against the Native Americans in the Fall of 1812 that included at least 18 separate actions between September 3 and December 24, 1812. If the capture of Canada was the motive of the Westerners, then why did Harrison not continue east after the Battle of the Thames and fall on the British flank/rear at Niagara? There, his experienced, battle-tested 3,000-man army, attacking from a flank, could have made a big difference on the overall fate of Canada. I think he stopped and went back west to Detroit because he had accomplished what he had set out to do – thrown the British and Native Americans out of the Northwest and secured it from further intrusions.

I think this essay sheds light on another controversial question regarding the War of 1812: Was the 1811 “Battle of Tippecanoe” in effect the first battle of the War of 1812, or part of a separate struggle? In my opinion, if one holds the position that the War in the Northwest was pursued mostly to affect the conquest of Canada, then most probably one holds the position that the Battle of Tippecanoe was *not* the first battle of the War of 1812. However, if one holds the position that the War in the Northwestern Theater was pursued mostly for the purpose of pushing the British-influenced-and-supplied Native Americans into Canada and thus to secure an “enemy-free” Old Northwest for the United States, then most probably one holds the position that the Battle of Tippecanoe *was* the first battle of War of 1812.

After the conclusion of dialog on this subject, I continued researching books contained in my library. I found the following quotes quite informative:

“After British General Sir Isaac Brock received the American surrender of Detroit on August 16, 1812, he noted the Indians ‘appear determined to continue the contest until they obtain the Ohio for a boundary.’” John F. Winkler: “*The Thames 1813: The War of 1812 on the Northwest Frontier*” (Page 13).⁵

“Brock then took advantage of the triumph for which he would receive a knighthood and promotion to major-general. On August 29, he wrote directly to the Earl of Liverpool, urging the British government to adopt an aggressive policy on the Northwest Frontier. There should be no peace, Brock said, without the establishment of an area to be occupied only by Indians, and ruled by leaders allied with Britain. At a minimum, he said, the Americans must surrender to the Indians all lands beyond (i.e.: ‘north of’) the Greeneville Treaty line.”

-John F. Winkler: “*The Thames 1813: The War of 1812 on the Northwest Frontier*” (Page 13).⁶

“The War of 1812 would be remembered in Britain as the American War, but it might as aptly have been called the Kentucky War. Although the state had only 5 percent of the American population, it provided 60 percent of the American soldiers in the war and suffered 70 percent of the American casualties.

“The Kentuckians fought on the American Northwest Frontier. Their goal was to end the continuing threat that the British in Canada would incite and support Indian attacks on American settlers in the area between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes... After the peace treaty that followed, British support for the Indians ended, and raiding on the Northwest Frontier ceased.”

-John F. Winkler: “*The Thames 1813: The War of 1812 on the Northwest Frontier*” (Page 5).⁷

“The frontier people agreed that a war with Britain would enable the United States to eliminate the Indian problem once and for all and to seize Canada for the redress of British seizures of American ships and goods and the impressment of its merchant seamen during Britain’s war with France. Henry Clay, Speaker of the House and war hawk from Kentucky, spoke for most westerners when he said that Canada was ‘the instrument by which that redress was to be obtained.’ Jefferson also believed that the seizure of Canada would be ‘a mere matter of marching.’ War, then, meant opportunity under the guise of necessity.”

“Most Ohioans believed that war with Great Britain was necessary to solve the Indian problem and bring peace to the frontier. They also believed it was required to defend national honor regarding British impressment and denial of the American principle of freedom of the seas.... Most Ohioans understood that an attack on Canada was essential to achieving the goals of peace and honor.”

-R. Douglas Hurt: “*The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830*” (page 326).⁸

“The Niagara fiasco had shown that a large part of the American population was not in sympathy with the war – at least not with annexing Canada.”

-Chuck Lyons, “*Disaster at Queenston Heights*” *American Heritage*, December, 2008, (page 74).⁹

“As in the year 1754 a petty fight between two French and English scouting parties on the banks of the Youghiogheny River, far in the American wilderness, began a war that changed the balance of the world, so in 1811 an encounter in Indian country, on the banks of the Wabash, began a fresh convulsion which ended only with the fall of Napoleon. The Battle of Tippecanoe was a premature outbreak of the great wars of 1812.” – Henry Adams¹⁰

“The greatest significance of the Battle of Tippecanoe, however, lay in the damage it did to peace in the Indiana Territory... Fear and distrust between whites and Indians along the frontier increased immensely. The Indians sought revenge; the Americans believed that the British were exploiting that thirst to agitate them against the settlers. The resulting tensions probably did more to bring on the War of 1812 than all the seamen impressed by the British navy.”¹¹ – John S.D. Eisenhower

In conclusion, I maintain that it is quite feasible in the 21st Century to hold the position that the War of 1812 in the Northwestern Theater was an attempt at a land grab of Canada for the United States' economic exploitation. This is particularly feasible considering development of the subsequent doctrine of "Manifest Destiny" starting in the West in the 1830s, which is currently held in a less-than-favorable light by many in academia. In response, I propose that a careful review of the facts and contemporary records of that time lend just as much credence to the theory that the real reason for the pursuit of military activities in the Old Northwest was to secure this area from Native American and British (through their Native American clients) efforts to destabilize the area and perhaps detach it for re-assumption of British sovereignty (or joint British-Native American sovereignty) over the area. This was one of those relatively unusual situations where the aims of the local power structure (the "old Kentuckians," whose position may be stated as "push the Native Americans into Canada") meshed well with the aims of a significantly powerful voting bloc in the national government (the "War Hawks," whose position could be summarized as "march on and capture Canada").

The following passage perhaps sums up the various diverse positions most fully and succinctly:

"The War of 1812 was officially declared over the right of U.S. sailing ships to be free from search and seizure by the Royal Navy, then at war with Napoleonic France. Other underlying factors, however, were the ongoing British policy of aiding the Indians of the Northwestern frontiers against American settlement and the desire by an aggressive-minded congressional faction, known as the Young War Hawks, to invade Canada." -William Francis Freehoff, *"War of 1812: Battle of the Thames"* Military History, (October, 1996)¹²

This controversy seems more or less a case of choose your historian and/or facts, then choose your position.

Postscript note: I wish to clarify that I agree with the fact that there were many influential people in late-Eighteenth and early-Nineteenth Century America that coveted Canada as an acquisition. David R. Palmer in his book, "George Washington's Military Genius," pages 84-94¹³ gives a good explanation of this phenomenon during the Revolutionary War, and I recommend reading his account. However, I maintain the unique circumstances outlined in this essay give credence to other reasons the war was pursued in the Old Northwest Territory during the War of 1812.

Endnotes

¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_in_the_War_of_1812

² https://em.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kentucky_in_the_War_of_1812 Citing Kleber, John E., ed. (1992) The Kentucky Encyclopedia. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 0-8131-1772-0.

- ³ James D. Richardson (ed.). A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1797-1897. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), I, p. 504; restated in Rex L. Spencer, "The Gibraltar of the Maumee: Fort Meigs in the War of 1812." Diss. Indiana University, 1988, pp. 1-2.
- ⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_Rangers Citing Allison, Harold (1986). The Tragic Saga of the Indiana Indians. Paducah: Turner Publishing Company ISBN 0-938021-07-9, p. 241.
- ⁵ John F. Winkler. The Thames: The War of 1812 on the Northwest Frontier (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2016), p. 13.
- ⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷ Ibid., p. 5.
- ⁸ R. Douglas Hurt. The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 326.
- ⁹ Chuck Lyons. "Disaster at Queenston Heights." Military Heritage, 10, No. 3 (Winter 2008), p. 74.
- ¹⁰ John S.D. Eisenhower. Agent of Destiny: The Life and Times of General Winfield Scott (New York: The Free Press, 1997), p. 20.
- ¹¹ Ibid., p. 24.
- ¹² William Francis Freehoff. "War of 1812: Battle of the Thames." Military Heritage, (October 1996). Published Online: August 21, 2006.
- ¹³ Dave R. Palmer. George Washington's Military Genius (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2012), pp. 84-94.

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Essay # 3: What was the relative importance of the long rifle to the United States in the Northwestern and Southwestern Theaters of the War of 1812?

John Eric Vining 2018

Academic position (paraphrased): The War of 1812 was fought mainly with smooth-bore muskets, the standard weapon of most regular, militia, and volunteer units. In that war, the rifle has an inflated reputation. It did its best service in the West, but there were times the rifleman did not aim and take advantage of the superior accuracy and range of the weapon – they just banged away, sometimes behind cover. At New Orleans on January 8, 1815, some American soldiers were witnessed by surviving British soldiers as simply hoisting their rifles over their heads, over the rampart, and firing blindly at the advancing British. It was hard to hit much in the smoke-filled battlefields of the time anyway. At the December 24, 1814 battle at New Orleans, which was fought in the dark, the tomahawk and clubbed rifles probably caused most of the British casualties. The long rifle was not that important to the ultimate outcome at New Orleans...cannons were the arm of ultimate decision at that battle, as evidenced by the “cones of destruction” (delineated by the placement of fallen British soldiers in front of the artillery positions).

John Eric Vining's position:

I totally agree that the long rifle was of virtually no importance east of the Appalachian Mountains in the War of 1812. I will also concede that the long rifle was of little importance on the Northeast and North Central (Niagara) fronts.

However, in the Northwestern Theater, the long rifle and the tomahawk were of paramount importance to the American cause. As far as I can determine, of the Regulars, only the musket-armed 17th, 19th, 24th, and 27th U.S. Regulars took part in the conflict in the Northwest. Artillery played an almost insignificant role in the Northwest, except for the First Siege of Fort Meigs and the one hugely important cannon (“Old Betsy”) at Fort Stephenson. The most important force in the Northwest was mounted militia, a large majority of whom were Kentucky militia. While some of the unarmed or poorly armed Kentucky militia quite possibly were equipped with muskets at Newport, KY before moving north, a vast majority of Kentucky militia fighting the vast majority of the actions in the Northwest were self-armed with long rifles and tomahawks. Thus, my position is that the long rifle was the firearm of decision in the Northwest. I will not go into a long defense as this is virtually self-evident.

I will concede that artillery was the weapon of decision at New Orleans. I will also concede that some British soldiers observed some American soldiers hoisting their weapons over the parapet and firing blindly at the advancing British. I will contest that the American long rifle was not a significant contributor to the American victory at New Orleans.

First, we must take all actions in the overall Battle(s) of New Orleans into account. Particularly in the December 24th battle, it is highly likely that given the main body of troops involved was rifle-armed Tennessee militia, a significant percentage of the British casualties in this battle were almost certainly inflicted by long rifles (with a heavy nod to the cannon of the American ships in the river as well).

In the January 8th British assault, it has been noted that many of the casualties were located in cones of destruction in front of the artillery positions. First, while I don't necessarily disagree with this, the only way to definitively prove it would be to (1) have an unaltered photograph of the actual fallen casualties on the battlefield or (2) have markers placed where the casualties fell and have a photograph of those markers. Obviously, photographic technology was not available at that time. Thus, we are limited to word-of-mouth accounts translated to paper, with all the possible inaccuracies this could entail. Secondly, we have no idea of the number of casualties within these alleged cones of destruction that were inflicted by small-arms. Certainly, the casualties beyond a maximum of 250 yards were cannon-inflicted, but closer than that, we just don't know with absolute certainty what weapons/projectiles inflicted which/how many wounds.

We know that General Gibbs' assault (the major one on the part of the British) was directed at the portion of the Rodriguez Canal line held by General Carroll's Tennessee militia. We know that this militia was originally the "West Tennessee Militia," later known as the "2nd Tennessee Militia." This militia was very experienced in the Creek War of late-1813 and early-1814 – indeed it could be stated that this was the main force (along with the 39th U.S. Infantry and Coffee's mounted militia) that defeated the Creeks at Horseshoe Bend. This militia force was overwhelmingly long rifle-armed.

A second force at New Orleans backing up Carroll's Tennessee Militia was Adair's Kentucky Militia. From what are at best cloudy references as to how this force was armed and employed on the Rodriguez Line, it seems that a minimum of 250 (perhaps 500) of the Kentucky troops were long rifled and actually employed on the line during the battle. Another uncertainly-defined contingent of musket-armed Kentucky militia may have been employed here as well. So, it seems that the largely musket-armed British assault was launched head-on into a largely rifle-armed American contingent ensconced behind the Rodriguez Canal ramparts.

It has also been stated that only 25% of American soldiers on the Rodriguez Line had bayonets. Military muskets have attachments for bayonets; long rifles do not. This might indicate that approximately 25% of the soldiers on the Rodriguez Line had muskets; perhaps 75% were long rifle-armed (although it must be admitted that it is very possible there may have not been enough bayonets available for all the muskets on the line. Therefore, this cannot be considered as anything close to a rock-solid indicator for the percentages noted).

I think the major value of the American long rifle at New Orleans was that this weapon contributed to a continuous maintenance of fire on the British attackers from about 800 yards distant from the Rodriguez Line on in. Cannons firing round shot have an effective range of approximately 800 yards (perhaps an

absolute maximum of 1,200 yards). Cannons firing canister/grapeshot have a maximum effective range of 350 to 400 yards. Long rifles have an aimed-fire range of 150 to 200 yards. Muskets firing buck-and-ball have a maximum effective range of 50 to 75 yards. Thus, the British soldiers were under continuous effective fire for a minimum of 800 yards (don't ever let anyone tell you the British foot soldiers were cowards).

Now, for the contention that the long rifle was not that important at New Orleans because the soldiers held the weapons over their heads and fired blindly. I will base my argument partially on personal experience and knowledge, and partially on a position held by Theodore Roosevelt. Gleig¹ stated that American soldiers hoisted their weapons over their heads, over the Rodriguez Canal ramparts, and fired blindly at the on-coming British infantry. Gleig reported it, Roosevelt noted it, and I tend to believe Gleig and Roosevelt. However, for the sake of argument, Gleig did not note whether these were musket-armed Americans or rifle-armed Americans. (Given the notorious inaccuracy of muskets, I might have been tempted to do this as well – one probably had nearly as much chance of hitting a British soldier doing this as aiming the weapon!)

However, again for the sake of argument, let's say that the soldiers that were observed were actually riflemen, given we have essentially established that a high percentage of men in Carroll's and Adair's line were riflemen. Here is what I think might have happened: With the disparity of accuracy between a rifle and a musket, the American rifle-armed militia would have been in virtually no danger from the musketarmed assaulting British from the time that the on-coming British attackers were 200 yards out (the maximum point where the Americans could have aimed and hit with any degree of accuracy) to the time that they were 75 yards out (the maximum effective range of a musket). During that time, the Americans would have been virtually perfectly safe to pop up over the rampart, take aim, and fire. Now, when the British got within 60 to 75 yards, then at least some American riflemen might have been tempted to (and apparently did) hoist their rifles over the rampart and fire blindly at the oncoming British.

Further, the American cannon had been firing since the British assault reached at least 800 yards from the Rodriguez Canal; the smoke over the line would have been heavy. The British likely could not have seen how the Americans were firing when they were 200 yards from the American line (although they might have been able to see what the Americans were doing when they were 60 yards from the American line).

My first observation is from personal experience. In my younger days, I hunted deer with a muzzleloaded replica of a Kentucky rifle. I can personally attest that from a range of approximately 120 yards, a Kentucky rifle with a 33.5-inch barrel (the weapon being 49 inches long overall), firing a .45 caliber round ball, pushed by a 54-grain black powder charge, will go completely through a fully-grown 7-point buck, missing the bullseye (the heart) by 1.5 inches of fall, and breaking a rib on the far side of the deer as it completely exits the animal. The Kentucky rifle is a potent weapon even in my relatively untutored hands.

My weapon weighs 7.0 pounds (unloaded), and is similar in most respects to that carried by the Tennessee militia at New Orleans (the major difference is that mine is percussion-cap fired, while 1812 models were flint-actuated). The trigger pull is quite heavy. I can assure you that at 6 feet, 190 pounds (probably significantly larger than the average militiaman of 1812), and after lifting weights for many years, I find it quite difficult to hoist the weapon over my head with one arm and do anything with it, much less shoot it.

A much more damning observation comes from Theodore Roosevelt in his critically-acclaimed *"The Naval War of 1812"* (1882). In this book he makes the following statement (page 263, footnote 3): *"Gleig, by the way, in speaking of the battle itself, mentions one most startling evolution of the Americans, namely, that 'without so much as lifting their faces above the ramparts, they swung their firelocks by one arm over the wall and discharged them' at the British. If anyone will try to perform this feat, with a long heavy rifle held in one hand, and with his head hid behind a wall, so as not to see the object aimed at, he will get a good idea of the likelihood of any man in his senses attempting it."*

Later in the 1880s, Theodore Roosevelt came to learn a great deal about 19th Century weapons from his time on the frontier in the American West. Yet in later years he never returned to the published book and amended or adjusted the above quoted statement in any way.

As an aside, just 21 years after the Battle of New Orleans, there was another stalwart group of likearmed Westerners with a group of Tennesseans as their backbone. They served at a similarly improvised, makeshift bastion and faced equal to perhaps even greater odds against an assaulting force at a place called The Alamo. They had a relatively limited supply of ammunition for a fairly limited number of cannons. They achieved a minimum estimated 2 to 1 casualty ratio, and more likely an estimated 3 to 1 casualty ratio. I have not yet found any reports of them hoisting long rifles over their heads and firing blindly at their attackers.

My argument does raise some questions, however:

- 1) Were the uneducated and perhaps poorly-informed militiamen savvy enough to realize that their opponents were musket-armed, and that their own weapons significantly outranged their opponents? Realizing this, would they have projected their heads and shoulders over the parapet to aim and fire their rifles while their opponents were at longer range, knowing they were in virtually no danger from return fire?
- 2) Did the rifle-armed militia sense that the vast amount of smoke engulfing the Rodriguez Canal line made target acquisition difficult, and feel that there was no reason to aim and fire their weapons since they couldn't see anything at which to aim anyway?

My position is that the rifle-armed militia indeed aimed and fired their rifles at the oncoming British when the British were between 200 and 75 yards from the Rodriguez Canal (but the British could not see them doing this). When the American militia saw/sensed/felt return fire from the onrushing British, at least a few hoisted their weapons over their heads and ramparts and attempted to fire blindly at the British (and the

British could see them doing this). Thus, I hold the position that the long rifle significantly contributed to the continuous heavy volume of accurate firepower to which the British were subjected from 800 yards to point blank range on the Chalmette Plain on January 8th, 1815.

Since you know some of my theories and methodology from Essay # 1 earlier in this compendium, I refrained from going into a somewhat extended and thus boring recitation of sources and footnotes.

Concluding Point # 1:

John Vining: “The American long rifles might have had nearly as great a psychological impact on the British as they did physical impact.”

Military Classics Illustrated, pages 85 and 86: “Two brothers in the company took a piece of board, five inches broad, and seven inches long, with a piece of white paper, about the size of a dollar, nailed in the center, and while one of them supported this board perpendicularly between his knees, the other at a distance of upwards of sixty yards, and without any kind of rest, shot eight bullets successively through the board and spared a brother’s thighs!

“Another of the company held a barrel stave perpendicularly in his hand, one edge close to his side, while one of his comrades at the same distance, and in the matter before mentioned, shot several bullets through it, without any apprehensions of danger on either side. The spectators, appearing to be amazed at these feats, were told that there were upwards of 50 persons in the company who could do the same thing; that there was not one that could not plug 19 bullets out of 20 within an inch of the head of a ten-penny nail...”

(Page 86) “News of these exploits...reached London, England where the following appeared in a newspaper: ‘This province has raised over 1,000 riflemen, the worst of whom will put a ball into a man’s head at a distance of 150 to 200 yards...’”²

Concluding Point # 2:

John Vining: The long rifle was actually there, in the West, in the mounted militias’ hands, while government-issued muskets either had not yet been manufactured or were in short supply in the West. Perhaps the Americans could not have pursued a conflict in the Northwest and Southwest Theaters without the long rifle.

Martin Caiden, *Messerschmitt 109*: “And it is the historian who would, somewhat wryly, point out that the... (Me-109’s major competitor[s] were) ...absent for the many years that the Me-109 fought on such a wide scale...”³ **Conclusion:**

John Vining: “I feel rifles were very important in the Northwest during the War of 1812 simply for the reason that most of the soldiers there were mounted militia, and most of the mounted militia were armed with long rifles. No mounted militia – no army. No army – no resistance to the British in the Northwest, and today I might be singing ‘*God Save the Queen*’ instead of ‘*The Star-Spangled Banner*!’”

Postscript note: I wish to clarify that I agree that the combination of the smoothbore musket and the bayonet were dominant weapons in the relatively flat battlefields of Europe and in most theaters other than the Northwest and Southwest Theaters of the War of 1812. David R. Palmer in his book, “George Washington’s Military Genius,” pages 10-16⁴ gives a good description of standard infantry tactics in the late-Eighteenth Century, and I recommend reading his account. However, I maintain the unique circumstances outlined in this essay give credence to reasons the long rifle was the decisive weapon in the western theaters of the War of 1812.

Endnotes

¹ Gleig, Ensign H.R., *Narrative of the Campaigns of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans.* Philadelphia, 1816.

² David G. A. Weidener, “The Continental Rifleman,” *Military Classics Illustrated*, 3800-7 (2001), p. 85-86.

³ Martin Caidin, *Me 109: Willy Messerschmitt’s Peerless Fighter*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968), p. 9.

⁴ Dave R. Palmer. *George Washington’s Military Genius* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2012), pp. 10-16.

Essay # 4: How important was the contribution of the Baratarians pirates – their arms (especially cannon), supplies, and physical participation – to the American victory in the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812?

John Eric Vining

2018

Academic position (paraphrased): The Baratarians contribution was important but modest. They didn't supply any cannons to Jackson. The records show they had smaller caliber guns than the ones Andrew Jackson had in his main line on January 8, 1815. There is no evidence that they trained Andrew Jackson's gunners – he had a fair number of men who knew how to handle artillery. The Baratarians managed just one of his eight batteries. They did know the geography, which was really complicated, of the lower Delta, and this almost certainly helped Jackson. Jane Lucas de Grummond's documentation that the Baratarians supplied cannon balls, gunpowder, and other supplies to the American army has been discredited. Overall the Baritarians' role has been overstated, mainly because of the romantic appeal of putting pirates at the center stage in the campaign.

John Eric Vining's position:

To restate my research methodology for this essay:

In order to increase the probabilities of accuracy in researching history, I virtually always attempt to have (at least) three sources as I research historical subjects: one source with a copyright date as close to the event as possible; one source with a copyright date approximately 50 years or so after the event; and one or more sources with relatively current copyright dates. In the case of the Western Theater of 1812, for my oldest source I chose "History of the Late War in the Western Country" by Robert Breckinridge McAfee (copyright 1816). For my mid-dated books, I chose "Pictorial History of the War of 1812," by Benson Lossing (1869) and "Naval History of the War of 1812" by Theodore Roosevelt (1882). For my recent sources, I chose (among others) "Encyclopedia of the War of 1812," (various essays/entries) edited by Jeanne T. Heidler and David S. Heidler (1997), and three sources specific to the Battle of New Orleans: "The Battle of New Orleans," by Robert Remini (2001), as well as two articles: "'Decisive' Battle Follows Victory," by Joe D. Huddleston, Muzzle Blasts (1991) and "Old Hickory's Finest Hour," by Thomas Fleming, Great Battles: Monumental Clashes of the 19th Century, (2004).

From reviewing these sources, I was able to reconstruct my thought processes from a few years ago when I wrote "The Trans-Appalachian Wars" (circa 2007 to 2009):

- 1) We know from a listing of soldiers/commanders that Jackson was (somehow) able to come up with a set of skilled artillerists: U.S. Army artillerists, experienced New England merchant sailors, ex- U.S.S. *Carolina* gunners, and the Baratarians. (Baratarians commanded one battery and served on another.) This more or less settles this issue. From Remini, (2001) p. 100-101, and Huddleston (1991) p. 41-42.
- 2) The Baratarians' island base was raided on September 16th, 1814 by Patterson and Ross, and 20 cannons were captured. From McAfee (1816), p. 494; and Remini (2001), p. 36.
- 3) Jean Lafitte et al did not retaliate for this raid, and indeed Lafitte, his brothers, and at least some other Baratarians later agreed to cooperate with the American command structure. (Virtually all references noted in the methodology paragraph above discussed some variation on this general theme.)
- 4) We know exactly which cannons were in which battery in Jackson's defenses. ("1 long 32, 3 long 24's, 1 long 18, 3 long 12's, 3 long 6's, a 6-inch howitzer, and a small carronade...and on the same day Patterson had in his water-battery: 1 long 24 and 2 long 12's.") From Roosevelt (1882) p. 260, (citing Latour [1816], p.147¹); and Huddleston (1991) pp. 41-42.
- 5) We know that the U.S.S. *Louisiana* was armed with "24-pounder" cannons. From Fleming (2004) p. 24.
- 6) We know that Jackson and Patterson "offloaded" cannon to (at least) the western bank of the Mississippi defenses. From McAfee (1816), p. 515, and Roosevelt (1882), p. 261.
- 7) We know that there were only four 24-pounder cannons on the American line on January 1, 1815: One on the West bank and three on the Rodriguez Line. From Roosevelt (1882) p. 260, (citing Latour [1816], p.147); and Huddleston (1991) pp. 41-42. By January 8 he may have added two more 24-pounders to the West bank positions (Huddleston, [1991], p. 41). Consequently, at most six cannons could have come from the *Louisiana*. (Most probably from her "West bank" [probably port] broadside, since the east [presumably starboard] cannons raked the Rodriguez Line front during the January 8th battle.)
- 8) Jackson's army was short of ammunition. Lafitte's Baratarians supplied ammunition to correct the shortage. We know that the Baratarians supplied cannonballs of assorted sizes. From Remini [2001], p. 116 (citing de Grummond [1961], *Baratarians*, p. 121²): "Fortunately, batteries along the mud rampart at the Rodriguez Canal were relatively safe, because the gunners had plenty of ammunition, thanks to the Baratarian pirates...At the moment the gunners at the ditch had over 3,000 cannon cartridges, filled and empty, over 56,000 pounds of gunpowder, over 28,000 cannon shot of various sizes, over 21,000 musket cartridges, and over 12,000 flints."

- 9) Statement of informed opinion: None of the cannon on the American defenses of the Rodriquez Line or West Bank were too large to be operated on an 1812-era ship of ocean-going size.

There was only one 32-pounder cannon on the line, and all others were 24-pounders or less. We know the *Louisiana* was armed with 24-pounder cannon. I can (if necessary) cite many occurrences of War of 1812-era warships carrying 32-pounder cannons as well as 24-pounder cannons. Thus, regarding the statement (to paraphrase) that “the cannon on the Rodriquez Line were bigger than those possessed by the Baratarians pirates,” it is extraordinarily unlikely that the Baratarian’s ship-borne cannons were smaller than the smallest of the Rodriquez Line cannons (6-pounders).

Questions:

- 1) Why would Jean Lafitte not retaliate for the raid on his base, and the seizing of his cannons, unless he early suspected that he was going to join an alliance with the Americans and that the Americans would need those cannons (and other armaments as well)?
- 2) How could Lafitte supply the Americans’ artillery ammunition needs unless (1) he had the correct size cannon balls on hand because, (2) the American cannons had been his cannons before Patterson captured them?
- 3) We know that Jackson fortified the west bank of the Mississippi with Morgan’s Louisianans and some of Adair’s Kentuckians. If Jackson suspected there would be an assault on his western flank across the Mississippi River, why would he heavily strip the cannons from the (presumably) western (presumably port) side of the *Louisiana*? (Since we only know definitively that there were four 24-pounder cannons on the two lines, it is virtually apparent that he offloaded four cannons [at most six] from the *Louisiana*: one [perhaps three] for the west and three for the east)
- 4) The *Louisiana* was a converted merchant ship. She was not designed for armament, and was of shallow enough draft to operate easily in the Mississippi River (even relatively close to the east bank on the December 24th battle). How could she reputedly carry (and allegedly contribute) bigger cannons than those cannons on the Baratarian’s ocean-going corsair/raiders – ships that were purposed-designed for sea-going armament, warfare, and battling at moderate to long ranges? It seems intuitive that the *Louisiana* would carry the same size or *smaller* cannons than the Baratarian ships.

I do have a kind of “smoking gun” statement as follows: “There is no record of his [Jackson] meeting with Lafitte, but Jean and his brother Pierre were soon part of the general’s staff, and their brother, Dominique You, was commanding a battery of cannons **hoisted from the buccaneers’ ships.**” [Emphasis mine.] From Fleming (2004) p. 23. However, as Fleming’s statement is not footnoted, I am not willing to

be rock-solid on the concrete validity of the statement. Thus, regarding the identity of the source of the cannons present in the New Orleans defenses, this leaves three final (virtually unanswerable) questions:

- 1) The American Army of West Tennessee began assembling at Camp Blount, Tennessee in September, 1813. Between that time and the Battle of Horseshoe Bend on March 27, 1814 (roughly six months), that army was able to accumulate only two cannons (a 6-pounder and a 3-pounder) for this battle. Yet, another Jackson-led southern army – that as late as midNovember, 1814 was at Mobile, and was not convinced that New Orleans was the ultimate target of the British – was able to accumulate a minimum of sixteen (large) cannons by yearend, 1814 at New Orleans (roughly a month-and-a-half). Where did the majority of American cannons on the Rodriguez Line and the West Bank at New Orleans come from?
- 2) Andrew Jackson was almost certainly aware that he would be outnumbered by the British at New Orleans. He was almost certainly savvy enough to be aware that cannons were what we now call “force multipliers” that potentially could even the odds for his numerically inferior force. Why would the United States choose *not* to use the cannons it captured from the Baratarian pirates in the September 16, 1814 raid on the pirate base in the defense of New Orleans – in that cannons eventually proved to be the key to the U.S. defensive efforts and ultimate victory?
- 3) Thus, the final, key question: Were the majority of the cannons on the Rodriguez Line during the battles of New Orleans captured from the Baratarian pirates on September 16, 1814?

Inductive reasoning would indicate a substantial probability that at least some (if not most) of the cannons on the Rodriguez Line were supplied (perhaps somewhat unwillingly) by the Baratarian pirates. Also, given the amount of ammunition and other materiel the Baratarians supplied to Jackson, the participation of the Baratarians in the American cause would seem to be very important to the defense of New Orleans.

Endnotes

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Essay # 5: “Who was the greatest American general to emerge from the War of 1812?”

John Eric Vining

2018

Academic position (paraphrased): Major General Andrew Jackson was the preeminent military leader to emerge from the War of 1812. He faced great obstacles, had few materials with which to work, had little support from the central government, and achieved remarkable results. He “did more with less.”

John Eric Vining’s position:

My correspondent and I agreed on many of the particulars on this issue. One thing we certainly agreed upon was that debates on this issue are pure opinion. There always has been and probably always will be legitimate differences of opinion on the relative merits of individual commanders. To develop this essay, I will start out with a couple of what I consider to be generally agreed upon points, discuss several relatively technical factors in which my top two generals were both greatly competent, share my opinion on why my choice is ranked slightly higher in my mind, and finish with some concluding comments. The War of 1812 is notorious for the perception that great generalship was lacking at the highest levels of the United States military leadership. Early in the war, elderly generals and other aging highranking officers from the Revolutionary War again assumed leadership of the war effort in this conflict. However, most were past their prime at this point in their careers. By now, generals like William Hull, Henry Dearborn, Stephen Van Rensselaer, Wade Hampton, James Wilkinson, and James Winchester were no longer up to the task of effectively leading their commands to victory.

In my opinion, only four officers demonstrated great leadership abilities and achieved outstanding successes during the War of 1812: Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Winfield Scott, and Jacob Brown. Three other mid-grade officers also showed flashes of brilliance which eventually would lead to generalships and significant military achievements later in life: Brevet Lieutenant Colonel John E. Wool (see Essay # 9 for details), Brevet Major William Worth, and Brevet Major Zachery Taylor. Of the above seven officers, two stood head-and-shoulders above all others in their performance during the War of 1812: Jackson and Harrison. To begin the evaluation of the relative merits of these two commanders, let’s discuss their many shared traits and competencies.

Both generals had:

1. Outstanding regional strategic vision, and a superb ability to grasp the big picture.
2. Great abilities to read the tactical battlefield landscape and subsequently deploy troops effectively.
3. The ability to use military intelligence effectively.
4. Skills in developing and utilizing outstanding subordinates, and eventually trusting these subordinates to the point of giving them relatively wide latitude in the field.
5. Good administrative talents which facilitated the building and fielding of well-organized armies.
This also gave them the ability to make superlative use of written orders to subordinates.
6. A great grasp of the importance of logistics. Both had the misfortune to campaign in regions that were not sufficiently developed to supply the equipment and provisions needed for success; thus, both had to deal with long and tenuous supply lines.
7. A determination to overcome obstacles.
8. A recognition of the importance of taking care of his men.
9. The ability to remain calm and to not panic at reverses on the battlefield itself.
10. The ability to successfully utilize militia, who were notoriously hard to handle.

It is very important to expand on this last point right off the bat. Mounted militia was indispensable to any commander attempting to be successful in the Western Theatre of the War of 1812. Due to the Jeffersonian philosophy of maintaining an insignificant “standing army,” the United States Regular Army was very small. There was a basic lack of Eastern support for the war in the Trans-Appalachian West, and available Regular Army troops and armaments were generally in short supply there. What Regular soldiers there were in the West were almost all on the Niagara front. Mounted militia could fill the gap: they could be called up quickly, in large numbers, for short periods; and being mounted they could move far and quickly (in the War of 1812, in the Northwest from Kentucky to Fort Meigs; and in the Southwest from Tennessee to the Gulf Coast). Mounted militia could wield massive and effective firepower. This was due to the large number of frontier riflemen raised for service, the frontiersman’s prowess with the long rifle, and the militia’s ability to fight either mounted or dismounted in rough country. George Washington deprecated the value of militia in the Revolutionary War, but both Jackson and Harrison based their respective successes on the effective use of militia and/or mounted militia.

There were certain areas where one general was perhaps slightly stronger than the other. Harrison faced the need to gather great quantities of material at forward bases to attack Detroit, Fort Malden, and Sandwich, yet he could not base troops close to these strong points because of the difficulty of supplying *his* adjacent base, Fort Meigs. Because it was so difficult to accumulate quantities from his forward commissaries of Piqua, Urbana, and Franklinton (Columbus) to Fort Meigs (basically because of Meigs’ inaccessibility due to the Great Black Swamp and the meandering St. Marys River), basing troops at Meigs

essentially caused them to eat up all the food accumulated there without spare supplies to move forward and attack! In essence, Harrison had to build an effective supply line from Cincinnati to Fort Meigs and defend it from counterattacks from the British to the north and the Native Americans to the west.

Harrison's answers were strategically brilliant. First, he built a series of forts that were vertically strong and mutually supporting to stymie British efforts to either invade Ohio or interdict his supply lines (see Essay # 6 for details). Second, Harrison conducted a campaign of raids against the Native Americans to neutralize their threat to the supply line from the west (see Essay # 7 for details). These strategies eventually allowed Harrison to base approximately 8,000 soldiers in northern Ohio for his successful 1813 campaign against Detroit and Upper Canada.

Harrison also pursued a difficult amphibious operation to accomplish his 1813 campaign. Once Oliver Hazard Perry succeeded in defeating the British squadron in the hugely important Battle of Put-in-Bay (Lake Erie), Harrison was prepared to invade Canada. Perry's victory secured Harrison's strategic right flank, and also secured for him the tactical advantages of rapid maneuver and rapid supply, advantages that until Put-In-Bay had belonged to the British. Harrison's new task was to utilize these newly won advantages to invade Canada.

Harrison succeeded brilliantly. Well before Put-In-Bay, he had secured an outstanding working relationship with Perry. Now, in tandem with Perry, he used the American naval vessels that could be repaired quickly, the captured British naval vessels that could also be repaired quickly, and Army-built, lake-going bateaux to "island-hop" first to the off-shore Lake Erie islands, and then to the coast of Canada. Simultaneously, he sent Richard Mentor Johnson's Kentucky Mounted Militia Regiment on a long, rapid, left-flank march to capture Detroit. As a result of Harrison's bold strategies and tactics, his forces found both Fort Malden (in Upper Canada) and Fort Detroit (in Michigan Territory) abandoned by the British when the Americans arrived.

Andrew Jackson, in the Creek War of 1813-'14 and the War of 1812 in the Southwest, was successful for a combination of several of Harrison's characteristics, but added defining qualities of his own: a fiery will, personal ferocity, and personal intimidation. Jackson had no formal military education and was one of the few American generals to personally slay an opponent in battle. Like Harrison, he knew how to raise and supply his men; he knew how to fortify his supply line; and he knew how to pick leaders for the militia. However, he added the characteristics that he simply would not give up no matter what the situation; he simply would not be beaten; and he would move his men forward to defeat the enemy via domination of both friend and foe with his own personal will.

Jackson conducted three very different campaigns from 1813 to 1818. First was *The Creek War* – fought with short term militia over long distances with limited supplies. Next was *The New Orleans Campaign* – a series of stand-up, set-piece battles with British veterans of the Napoleonic Wars. Finally, he

conducted the *1st Seminole War* – nominally fought against the Seminoles but *really fought* to show the Spanish that the United States could take the Floridas anytime it wanted – a psychological war in the best tradition of Anthony Wayne and William T. Sherman. This conflict directly led to the purchase of the Floridas from Spain.

Jackson was a master in the art of psychological warfare. In the Creek War, he totally devastated the Red Stick Creek army at Horseshoe Bend, then plowed a destructive path through Creek territory to the Creek's holy ground at the confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers. At that point, he erected Fort Jackson directly upon this holy ground, from which he negotiated a treaty which extracted **22 million acres** from the defeated Red Stick Creeks – and from his mainstream Creek allies as well.

In the New Orleans campaign, Jackson's scouts failed to note the advance of the British army until the British were about eight miles from Jackson's forces. Jackson reacted with a brilliant psychological ploy: even though Jackson's force was relatively unorganized and probably outnumbered at that point, he immediately launched a ferocious night attack on the British, stunning and basically fooling them into thinking the Americans were much stronger than they really were. The British hesitated, giving Jackson just enough time to erect fortifications, gather reinforcements, and accumulate enough arms, ammunition, and supplies to win the final "Battle of New Orleans" on January 8, 1815. It was a stunning success for the Americans and a stupendous personal accomplishment for Andrew Jackson.

There are three basic differences between Harrison's success in the campaign that resulted in the Battle of the Thames (essentially capping the War of 1812 in the Northwest), and Jackson's success in the campaign that resulted in the Battle of New Orleans (essentially capping the War of 1812 in the Southwest). Harrison had to conduct a long-distance *mobile offensive* campaign to succeed at the Thames. Jackson had to conduct a long-distance campaign that ultimately resulted in a *static defensive battle* at New Orleans. Although one may dispute the merits of this argument in this particular set of circumstances, in general, mobile offensive campaigns are more difficult to conduct than static defensive campaigns. Harrison had to attack an enemy who was based upon a fixed land mass, which conferred an implied long-term "staying power" to its defenders. Jackson faced an army that was conducting an amphibious invasion, whose base was in the Caribbean. This forced the British to be supplied by a long, tenuous supply line, which implied a relatively short "staying power" for the British invasion. In fairness, at the Thames, Harrison faced a relatively small number of Regular British infantry, backed by a somewhat larger number of Native American warriors, the aggregate of whom he significantly outnumbered. Jackson faced an army of battle-tested Regular British infantry, which somewhat outnumbered the Americans in terms of troops actually engaged by both sides in the January 8th battle.

Both Jackson and Harrison were outstanding commanders, but I tend to rate Harrison slightly higher. I see Jackson as a “super-early-19th Century” general, but one outstanding in the strategies, tactics, and skills of that time. In contrast, I see Harrison as the first of the modern generals, in the Eisenhower/Bradley mold: Harrison was skilled at working with a diverse officer corps (i.e.: with the Regular Army [the 19th, 24th, and 27th Regiments] and with the militia); had high concern for logistics (his fort lifelines across the Great Black Swamp); quickly exhibited recognition of his vulnerable left flank, then mounted a successful campaign to shore it up (the Fall, 1812 raids in Indiana Territory); and demonstrated his ability to work with an inter-service command structure (cooperation with Perry in the amphibious operation across Lake Erie to assault Fort Malden and Sandwich). Hence my opinion and conclusion that William Henry Harrison was, by a very slight margin, the most outstanding general to emerge from the War of 1812.

Postscript note: The War of 1812’s “*Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison*” are probably that war’s version of World War II’s “*George Patton and Omar Bradley*.” Today, when most people think about Jackson, they think of a general who became a populist-fueled, country-shaking U.S. president. When they think of Harrison, they think of a general who died about a month into his U.S. presidency. When most people think about Patton, they think of the hard-driving conqueror of Massena and Bastogne. When they think of Bradley, well...people don’t think about Bradley anymore. When Hollywood wanted to memorialize George Patton, they chose *20th Century Fox* to make an Oscar-winning movie about him. When Hollywood wanted to memorialize Omar Bradley, they chose *A&E Network* to make a television documentary about him. But it is important to note that when Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight Eisenhower selected a general to command American forces in the Allied invasion of Europe at Normandy, he chose...the steady Bradley, not the flashy Patton. In business terms, Eisenhower chose the steady “vice president of operations,” not the flashy “top sales executive.”

Essay # 6: The Importance of Forts to the Trans-Appalachian West, 1777-1814

John Eric Vining

2018

Academic position (paraphrased): John Keegan, an English author who during his lifetime was widely considered to be the pre-eminent military historian of his era, cast his attention on the role of warfare in the development of the United States in his 1996 volume “Fields of Battle: The Wars of North America.” One of his insightful observations from that book was that the North American continent’s military history was defined by the construction of forts, both to defend it from foreign powers and to assist in its conquest. By 1763, Keegan wrote, “North America was one of the most heavily fortified regions of the world.”¹

John Eric Vining’s position:

There is no contention between the academic world and me on this issue. Forts were crucial to the development of America, and nowhere were they more important than in the Trans-Appalachian West, especially the Old Northwest Territory.

Forts were important for three reasons: militarily, psychologically, and politically. Under these broad headings, there were three basic types of forts that were of great importance to the conquest, settlement, and economic exploitation of the Trans-Appalachian West: civilian defense forts, military forts, and traders’ posts/forts.

Before we begin this examination of forts under the above broad guidelines, it is important that we define² a list of terms that are important in gaining an understanding of just what a fort is and how one is constructed:

***Barracks:** A building or group of buildings for lodging soldiers, especially in garrison.

***Blockhouse:** *Military:* A fortified structure with ports or loopholes through which defenders may direct gunfire. Also called garrison house: (formerly), a building, usually of hewn timber and with projecting upper story, having loopholes for musketry.

***Casemate:** an armored enclosure for guns; a vault or chamber, especially in rampart, with embrasures for artillery.

***Embrasure:** (*in fortification*): an opening, as a loophole or crenel, through which missiles may be discharged.

***Fascine:** *Fortification:* a long bundle of sticks bound together, used in building earthworks and batteries and in strengthening ramparts.

***Moat:** A deep, wide trench, usually filled with water, surrounding the rampart of a fortified place, as in a town or castle.

***Palisade:** A fence of posts or stakes set firmly in the ground, as for enclosure or defense: any of a number of poles or stakes pointed at the top and set firmly in the ground in a close row with other to form a defense.

***Parapet:** *Fortification:* A defensive wall or elevation, as of earth or stone, in a fortification; an elevation raised above the main wall or rampart of a permanent fortification.

***Rampart:** *Fortification:* A broad elevation or mound of earth raised as a fortification around a place and usually capped with a stone or earth parapet; such an elevation together with the parapet. ***Stockade:** *Fortification:* A defensive barrier consisting of strong posts or timbers fixed upright in the ground; an enclosure or pen made with posts and stakes.

Note: As a general reference, “stockade” is to “palisade” as “vehicle” is to “automobile.” A stockade is generally associated with civilian defense forts and trading posts, and indicates a generic kind of puncheon-built enclosure. A palisade is generally associated with military forts and indicates an engineered type of walled defense structure. Nevertheless, these two terms seem to be used rather interchangeably in historical literature.

Civilian Defense Forts

Perhaps the earliest type of fort in evidence west of the Appalachian Mountains was the civilian defense fort. Early examples of civilian defense forts were Boonesborough and the various “stations” in the early Kentucky settlement stage (Ruddle’s Station, Martin’s Station, Bryan’s Station, and Logan’s Station). These were essentially fortified villages, used in defense to deter or defend against Native American raids. In appearance, the rear walls of the component shops and dwellings of the village comprised essential parts of the defensive outer walls. Stockade pickets filled the spaces between the buildings. The corners may have been comprised of blockhouses, but this was not always the case. For an example of what in appearance might be considered a relatively typical civilian defense fort, please view the photo of a reconstruction of the 1816 version of Fort Wayne, Indiana at the conclusion of this essay. (It should be noted that Fort Wayne was constructed as a kind of combination of a military and civilian installation, which gives evidence of the source of oft-noted confusion between the different types of Midwestern forts.) Some characteristics of civilian defense forts are:

- 1) Little deliberate or professional design, with no properly developed overlapping fields of fire
- 2) Sometimes haphazard construction
- 3) Poorly sited, sometimes with surrounding heights overlooking the interior of the fort
- 4) Poorly developed fields of fire, with woods and/or creeks in close proximity to the fort

- 5) Purpose was to guard civilian populations or geographical areas
- 6) Manned by civilians or relatively unorganized local militia
- 7) Of little military value
- 8) Of little or no psychological value.

However, some civilian forts could develop into a relatively significant psychological and/or quasimilitary factor. For example, Fort LaMotte in Illinois was located in a strategic location, guarding both a riverine and a land gateway to military Forts Harrison and Knox. As such, the first iteration of the fort was burned by Native Americans on September 21, 1812, as a part of the “post-fall of Detroit” Indian offensive in Autumn, 1812. On April 18, 1813, it was the site of one of the few battles of the War of 1812 in Illinois, the Battle of Africa Point. Fort Vallonia in southern Indiana was the prototypical civilian defense fort, providing shelter for local settlers during times of Native American unrest and serving as the home base of a unit of Indiana Rangers, a mobile state militia defense force. It provided the backdrop for perhaps the most famous Indian/Ranger battle of the Northwest in the War of 1812. And finally, a settler massacre by Red Stick Creeks at a poorly designed civilian Fort Mims in southern Alabama on August 30, 1813, provided the decisive spark for an entire war, the Creek War of 1813-1814.

A very important set of civilian defense forts in the Old Northwest Territory was the string of strongpoints that stretched in a great arc from Cleveland to Franklinton (Columbus) to Dayton, Ohio. From Cincinnati it stretched on a slight southwest slant across southern Indiana and southern Illinois. A common characteristic of this set of civilian defense forts is that almost all were built in the 1810s, most between 1811 and 1813. Although the arc forms an almost continuous line from Cleveland to the Mississippi River in southern Illinois, this was not a planned defensive effort. It was based on the collective judgment of the settlers along this line that this was the limit of the frontier, north of which was Indian territory. This frontier was subject to increasing violence as Tecumseh’s and Tenskwatawa’s (“The Prophet’s”) Native American Confederacy became more of a reality and their warlike rhetoric stirred their followers to commit depredations against the white settlers along the frontier. These civilian defense forts were often no more than rough-hewn blockhouses that could shelter between 10 and 30 area families from the arrows and tomahawks of the attacking Native Americans. They were often so poorly engineered (from a military standpoint) that they were more of a trap than a defense for their inhabitants (re: Fort Mims in Alabama). The presence of these forts on the Ohio-Indiana-Illinois frontier, all built relatively simultaneously, fueled by collective fear, lends further credence to my contention that “a” cause (but perhaps not “the” cause) of the War of 1812 was the British-supplied Native American violence in the lower Northwest Territory.

Military Forts

Military forts were very important installations on the frontier of the Old Northwest and Old Southwest Territories, as well as everywhere in North America. They could be used to support overall military strategies for an area or region; provide secure refuge for garrisons and mobile military units; provide gathering and organizing points for military operations; and protect, secure, and control logistical and communication lines.

Some characteristics of military forts were:

1. Usually built in crucial, strategic locations
2. Many times, well-designed by professional military engineers, its characteristics including:
 - i open fields of fire
 - ii Containing technical military tactical features, such as:
 - iii built on a geographical high point; surrounded by cleared, open fields of fire
 - iv loopholes and/or embrasures for the protected discharge of weapons, usually featuring overlapping fields of fire
 - v ramparts capped by parapets; many times, these backed/supported the fort's palisades
 - vi blockhouses with overhanging second stories to facilitate defense
 - vii moats, filled with water which contained submerged, pointed fascine stakes to complicate assaults on the structure and garrison
3. Could have a great psychological-military impact on a region of the country
4. Many times a line of forts was built within one day's march or paddle of one another, facilitating secure, protected rest periods during the dark, overnight hours
5. Manned by regular army personnel or organized/state militia

A prototypical example of a military fort that was of crucial importance to the military history of the Old Northwest is Fort Recovery, Ohio. (Please note the photograph of Fort Recovery at the end of this essay.) Fort Recovery was begun by General Anthony Wayne late-1793 and completed in March, 1794. It was designed by master artilleryist Major Henry Burbeck (artillerists many times served as military engineers in the old army; Burbeck also designed Fort Defiance in 1794.). It contained well-designed, two-story blockhouses, the second story overhanging the first to inhibit scaling the walls. The blockhouses' embrasure cuts were designed at 45-degree angles to the interior, providing the widest field of fire combined with the smallest appropriate aperture for the protection of the riflemen in the casemate inside. These blockhouses were built at appropriate angles to sweep the adjoining palisades with defensive fire. The palisades themselves were approximately 12 feet tall, pointed at the top, and the individual logs of sufficient diameters

to resist the relatively light field artillery that could be transported through the remote wilderness to assail them. The relatively small gate/sally port was designed with reasonable protection for the time.

The fort also contained two crucial psychological factors that were characteristic of the genius of Anthony Wayne. First, a consciously-designed feature was that it was constructed precisely on the location of a former horrendous setback for the United States Army: “St. Clair’s Defeat” (also known as the “Battle of the Wabash” or the “Battle of the Upper Wabash”). This fort was deliberately built to show that the United States Army had recovered from the defeat and could (and thus, would) march inexorably forward to defeat its opponents. (Forts Defiance and Wayne were similarly constructed on former Native American strongpoints/villages.) The second, perhaps less obvious psychological factor is that Fort Recovery was built in a location from which it could alternatively threaten either Kekeonga (eventually Fort Wayne, IN, to the northwest) or Au Glaize (eventually Defiance, OH, to the northeast). This introduced a factor of uncertainty to the Native American forces, which Wayne later enhanced by his subsequent building of Fort Adams and the cutting of alternate tracks to the east and west from there, further confusing the Indians. (Note: Fort Jackson provided the same psychological effect for General Andrew Jackson at the conclusion of the Creek War 1813-1814.)

Several military forts were present in what was to become the Old Northwest Territory during the Revolutionary War:

1. Ft. Pitt (American: the site of current Pittsburgh, PA, and the country’s western bastion)
2. Ft. Laurens (American - in Ohio: a “tripwire” fort protecting Fort Pitt from the British at Fort Detroit.)
3. Ft. Detroit (British: at “de troit” [“the strait”] between Lake St. Clair and Lake Erie)

The British maintained seven forts on American soil at the conclusion of the Revolutionary War in insolent defiance of the Treaty of Paris which ended the war. A major result of the American victory in the Northwest Indian Wars was that these forts were surrendered to American control as a part of the peace process.

1. Dutchman’s Point
2. Point-au-fer
3. Oswegatchie
4. Oswego
5. Niagara
6. Mackinac
7. Detroit

Two generations of military forts were of crucial importance to the conquest and retention of Northwest Ohio-Northeast Indiana-Southeast Michigan. The first were the forts which were built between 1790 and 1794 and ultimately utilized by Anthony Wayne to help win the Northwest Indian Wars. From

south to north (the direction of the “axis of advance” [all following lists of forts are south to north]), they were:

1. Fort Washington
2. Fort Hamilton
3. Fort St. Clair
4. Fort Jefferson
5. Fort Greeneville
6. Fort Recovery
7. Fort Adams
8. Fort Defiance
9. Fort Deposit

The second set were William Henry Harrison’s four lines of vertically ascending (from south to north) forts that provided defensive security for his line of communications to the Northwestern Front. (Please note the map at the end of this essay). Most of these forts were built in the 1812-1813 period. They provided secure, all weather logistical/supply lines for the accumulation of supplies, and thus soldiers, at crucial Fort Meigs, the key to the defense of Ohio, the offensive retaking of Detroit, and the menacing of Upper Canada.

Harrison’s westernmost line was the old set of forts first conceived and originally constructed by Anthony Wayne, guarding the St. Marys River line of advance:

1. Fort Loramie (together with Fort Barbee forming a base for the two westernmost lines of forts)
2. Fort Barbee (St. Marys)
3. Fort Adams 4. Fort Wayne

Next (to the east of the old Anthony Wayne line) were a progression of forts, built or renovated in the fall of 1812, that protected the Auglaize River line of advance:

1. Fort Loramie
2. Fort Barbee
3. Fort Amanda
4. Fort Jennings
5. Fort Brown blockhouse
6. Fort Winchester
7. Fort Meigs (designed by master military engineer Lt. Colonel Eleazar Wood)

Third, the old “Hull’s Trace” line of forts, first built by General William Hull during his advance on Detroit in the summer of 1812:

1. Manary’s Blockhouse
2. Fort McArthur
3. Fort Necessity
4. Fort Findlay
5. Fort Portage blockhouse
6. Fort Meigs

Finally, Harrison’s easternmost line of forts in Northwest Ohio, protecting the Sandusky River line of advance:

1. Fort Ferree
2. Fort Ball
3. Fort Seneca
4. Fort Stephenson (also designed by military engineer Lt. Colonel Eleazar Wood)

Harrison’s northwestern forts were crucial to his victory over the British and Indians in the War of 1812, by allowing him to securely accumulate enough men and supplies to overwhelm the allied British and Indians in the early fall of 1813. It is my opinion that these forts are a great and essentially overlooked factor in what was one of the most important positive results of the War of 1812: the final securing of the expanse between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River from British interference.

Trader’s Posts/Forts

Perhaps one of the most confusing, nebulous, and complicating factors in the American conquest and settlement of the Old Northwest Territory in the period from 1777 to 1814 was the presence of British trading posts in the Ohio-Indiana area.

It is an established fact that the British wanted to trade with the Native American tribes in the Old Northwest Territory in the period after the Revolutionary War. It is also clear that the British in Canada contracted with certain quasi-agents to trade supplies (including modern weapons) for pelts. A little bit of rational thinking will reveal the root of the problem.

Imagine you are a frontier trader, commissioned by the British to trade Empire goods with the Native Americans. To accomplish this, you must secure an inventory of British goods with which to trade. To do so, you would have to buy or handle on consignment this large, valuable inventory and secure it from loss in a rough frontier wilderness environment. How would you do this? By building a blockhouse of roughhewn logs, inside of which you would be able to lock up the inventory in a secure “casemate.” Further, suppose that you planned to trade horses or other livestock from this location. What would you do? Build a stockade of pickets, secured in the ground to keep the animals from pushing it over. You would make it

at least high enough to keep the animals from jumping over it and thieves from climbing over it and stealing the livestock (which was, in effect, “live inventory”). If you have a blockhouse with an extended stockade surrounding it, what do you appear to have? A fort! Please note the photos of a replica of Tanners’ Station, Kentucky, [shown in the midst of reconstruction] at the end of this essay. You can plainly see that it resembles a frontier fort. This similarity in appearance caused much controversy on the frontier, and may have been a contributing factor in the eruption of both the Northwest Indian Wars and the War of 1812.

At least one traders’ post eventually evolved into an important military installation. In 1769, Pierre Loramie, a French-Canadian fur trader, established a trading post just north of present Fort Loramie, Ohio. In 1782, General George Rogers Clark conducted a raid into this area and burned the post to the ground. In 1794, General Anthony Wayne ordered the construction of Fort Loramie at the general site of the old trading post, as this location straddled and controlled the portage between Loramie’s Creek and the St. Marys River. The newly-built fort served as a supply depot for Fort Adams, Fort Wayne, and Fort Defiance to the north. In the War of 1812, Fort Loramie continued its service as a supply depot for the western two of General Harrison’s four fortified supply routes. Fort Loramie was sold to a private interest in 1815.

Perhaps two of the most notorious traders’ posts were one in the Mackachee Highlands of Ohio (in present Zanesfield, northeast of Bellefontaine, Ohio) and one on the Eel River, northwest of present Fort Wayne, Indiana. Both were the objects of so much concern on the part of American powers that military expeditions were conducted against them. In 1786, Colonel Benjamin Logan mounted a military campaign to destroy Indian villages near the headwaters of the Mad River in the Mackachee Highlands of northcentral Ohio. A special target in this expedition was the destruction of “the English fort” at this location (as noted on a current historical marker on the site). This almost certainly was a British-sponsored and quasi-agent operated trading post in this area, given this late date.

The second notorious traders’ post was located on the Eel River adjacent to Little Turtle’s Town in northeast Indiana. This too was the object of a military raid on the part of the Americans. In mid-September, 1812, Colonel James Simrall led a military force against this “English fort” (again so-noted by a current historical marker on the site). And again, this was almost certainly a British-sponsored and quasi-agent operated trading post.

One can almost feel the concern that an “English fort” on American territory – supplying Native Americans hostile to white settlement with British rifles, ammunition, supplies, and mounts – would engender among frontier citizens and the American military establishment. It does not take much of a stretch of the imagination to envision a conversation similar to the following taking place in Louisville in 1810 between an American army officer and a frontiersman:

Officer: “Hey, Buckskin, haven’t seen ya around much lately. Where ya been?”

Trader: “Hi, Lieutenant! Up north tradin’ pelts with the British.”

Officer: “Oh, yeah? Where was that?”

Trader: “Up in Indiana Territory...on the Eel River – you know; the English fort a’ Little Turtle’s village.”

Officer: “Did I hear you right...did you say the ‘*English fort*’ in Indiana Territory?”

Trader: “Yeah, tha’s right.”

Officer: “Well, what were ya tradin’ and what were ya gittin’?”

Trader: “Oh, you know...tradin’ pelts for the necessities...beef jerky...salt...oats for ma horse...lead for ammo...gunpowder...a new lock for my old rifle...some new flints...and whilst I was at it, bought me a whole new rifle, too!”

Officer: “You got a new rifle? Let’s see it.”

Trader: “Over here...thar’ ‘tis.”

Officer: “Why, this looks like a British Royal Crest on this rifle!”

Trader: “Well, I’ll be durn-tootin’! It is...didn’t pay no ‘tention ta that!”

Officer: “Anybody else up there with you?”

Trader: “Nobody travelin’ w’ me directly. But they was a whole lotta fellas up thar’ when I got thar’!”

Officer: “Like who?”

Trader: “Like Injuns. Mos’ly Miamis, Pottawattamies, and Shawnees. They was tradin’ furs fer rifles, lead, an’ powder like it was goin’ outta style. They was a gunsmith thar’ an’ he was a-fixin’ their old rifles, too!”

Officer: “So let me get this straight...You were in an English fort in Indiana Territory watchin’ a large number of Indians tradin’ pelts for British guns, lead, and gunpowder... and gettin’ their old guns fixed?”

Trader: “Well, I’ll be gull-durned! Tha’s ‘zactly right!”


Civilian Defense Forts were the most ubiquitous, Military Forts the most valuable, and Traders’ Posts the most contentious of the quasi-military, military, and commercial installations on the TransAppalachian frontier. They all had a place in the conquest, settlement, and economic exploitation of the area between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River between 1777 and 1814. As such, they are worthy subjects of historical inquiry, study, and discussion.



Above is a photo of the 1816-era replica of Fort Wayne, Indiana. Note how the fort combines features of a civilian defense fort (interior buildings' back walls as components of the outer defense palisade) with those of a military fort (a corner blockhouse with an overhanging second story, loopholes, and embrasures). This mixture of features serves to emphasize the ambiguities in fort construction that added to the confusion surrounding fortification efforts and defensive postures in the Trans-Appalachian West. (Author's collection)



Above is a replica of Fort Recovery, Ohio. It is emblematic of classic 1790s-era military fort-building, designed by U.S. Army engineer Henry Burbeck. Burbeck built into the structure most of the salient features of frontier fort technology for this era in the Trans-Appalachian West. (Author's Collection)



Harrison's northern lines of forts, circa 1812-1813. The forts were mutually protective for defense, blocking the British south-bound advance from Detroit into Ohio and Indiana. The forts also provided secure, protected lines of supply to northern Ohio from Harrison's southern commissaries. (Map courtesy of Alan J. Vining and Teresa J. Vining)



The photo above captures Tanner's Station, Kentucky in the midst of reconstruction. Notice how the trading post contains several features of contemporary military forts (for example, a blockhouse [with loopholes] and a stockade fence). It is relatively easy to see how such a trading station easily might have been mistaken for an installation of a hostile foe on one's territory. (Author's Collection)

Endnotes

¹ <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/books/sir-john-keegan-historian-who-put-a-face-on-wardies-at-78.html>

² All definitions are from Dictionary.com Unabridged. Based on the Random House Unabridged Dictionary *Trademark Random House, Inc. 2018.

Essay # 7: An examination of Harrison's campaign in Ohio and Indiana against Native Americans in the Fall of 1812

John Eric Vining

2018

Academic Position (paraphrased): “The war against British regulars and Canadian militia required different tactics than those necessary to defeat the Indians. Harrison thereby assumed the dual obligation of destroying the Indian coalition and defeating the British Army and its Canadian allies.”¹ This indicates an apparent position that the War of 1812 in the Northwest Territory was two separate wars, in contrast to the position that the struggle in the Northwest was one integrated strategic effort against two confederated but diverse opponents.

John Eric Vining's Position:

One of the values of writing is that an author gets to research various topics in significant depth. In the course of this research, the writer sometimes comes upon a subject that has been under-documented. I feel that is the case for the topic of this essay. Years ago, as I became interested in the War of 1812 in the Old Northwest Territory, I read various accounts of the American tri-disasters of the surrenders of Fort Michilimackinac, Fort Dearborn, and Hull's surrender of Detroit in July and August, 1812. This almost invariably was followed by a discussion of the subsequent Native American offensive on the lower Midwest. The discussion of this offensive almost always centered on four actions: Pigeon's Roost, Fort Madison, Fort Harrison, and Fort Wayne. And that was it. However, in recently debating academics regarding the War of 1812 in the Old Northwest, I became aware of the large extent of the back and forth atrocities and/or military actions between the Euro-Americans and the Native Americans in, particularly, what would become all of Ohio and Indiana. This information was available in various bits and pieces, but I could not find a place where all of the actions were documented in a modern, flowing narrative that attempted to delineate and make sense of the violence and chaos.

This is my attempt to document these various actions in a flowing narrative. I want once more to re-emphasize one particular point already stated in the introduction to this compendium: this essay would not pass a rigorous academic review process. However, every effort has been made to make the essay as accurate as possible, utilizing available documentation. Eyewitness accounts, second-hand accounts, various types of old and new scholarship, and even historical markers were consulted to produce this work. Nevertheless, this essay should be considered a starting point, not a decisive conclusion, on a topic that has received scant attention over the years.

My research into this area indicated that the actions in the lower Midwest in the summer and autumn of 1812 could be divided into two broad categories: 1) the relatively unorganized Native American-Settler quasi-military back-and-forth atrocities in the summer and fall of 1812, and 2) the relatively organized Native American offensive actions and sieges subsequent to the American tri-disasters, followed by the counter-offensive raids by the United States against the Native Americans in the lower Midwest. The net result was that all these actions served to stabilize General William Henry Harrison's left flank as he pursued his plan to recapture Detroit and defeat the British/Native American alliance in Michigan Territory and Upper Canada.

Individual Indian/White Quasi-Military back-and-forth atrocities.

The first category of actions to be discussed will be the actions, outside of relatively organized battles and campaigns, that served to keep the lower Midwest inflamed from roughly June to December, 1812. When I note the quasi-military actions of the white Americans, I basically refer to the activities of local militia units, which were hastily-raised and barely-drilled. This is opposed to the slightly more organized and disciplined state militias that took part in the later, more organized raids in response to Native American offensive actions in northern Ohio and Indiana Territory.

On June 26th, 1812, an Indian named O'Mick (or "O'Mic") was hanged in Cleveland, Ohio's public square for the murder of two hunters, Michael Gibbs and a man named Buell (or "Buel"). O'Mick and a partner, Semo, killed Gibbs and Buell while they were asleep on Pipe Creek, in Huron County, Ohio.² O'Mick resisted climbing the scaffolding until he was promised a pint of whisky, which he promptly drank and then was sent to this doom.³ Semo was demanded by his tribe, who wished to perform his execution according to tribal rites. However, Semo, in tribal hands and comprehending his imminent fate, gave a war whoop and shot himself through the heart.⁴

A recurrent theme in my research of this period of Old Northwest military history is the extent to which the citizens of Ohio and Indiana were subject to a bad case of the "jitters" upon the fall of American far northern and western forts to the British/Native American alliance. The next two incidents will fully illustrate this phenomenon. The citizens of Conneaut, Ohio were quite aware that an active war was being pursued just to their west and north. They were also quite aware that the British exercised full naval control of Lake Erie, and that this control conferred upon Britain the ability to quickly land and swoop down upon the villages on the south shore of Lake Erie. On the night of August 11th, 1812, a sentinel posted on the lake shore observed boats approaching. Mistaking them for British raiders, the sentinel hastily threw down his rifle, jumped on his horse, and rode throughout the village crying that the British and Indians were coming and would be in the village in fifteen minutes. The citizens of Conneaut and East Conneaut scattered to various secret fastnesses, including one large group that hid in a local dense grove and maintained perfect

silence. Alas, the attack did not materialize, and the villagers returned to their homes later that evening.⁵ A similar panic had a humorous side. Captain William Drake formed a company of militia in the northern part of Delaware County, Ohio to protect against roving bands of Indians which were prevalent in that area. This company was subsequently posted to Lower Sandusky at the head of navigation of the Sandusky River (before the construction of Fort Stephenson) to protect that strategically important spot. Captain Drake was a hearty fellow and apparently quite fond of practical jokes. Late one night, shortly after Hull's surrender at Detroit, Drake decided to test the courage and alertness of his company. The captain slipped into some bushes a slight distance from where the company was sleeping, then suddenly fired his weapons and yelled, "Indians! Indians!" at the top of his lungs. The outlying sentinels, taking the cries as an emergency call from one of their own, quickly took up the cry as well, and promptly panicked the entire company. One first lieutenant was overcome by fear and, abandoning all weapons and decorum as well, dashed into the woods, lost his bearings, and fled fully ten miles – reaching the village of Radnor at daybreak. The frightened lieutenant filled the villagers with dread as he spun his tale, and the villagers each conveyed the alarm to his neighbor. Now fully as frightened as the officer, the villagers hastily gathered such belongings as they could quickly snatch from their cabins, flung them into their wagons, and frantically fled into the interior of the state.⁶

Two associated anecdotes illustrate the depth of this endemic panic. One family named Penry drove their wagon and team over the rutted paths so violently that they threw their little two-year-old son from the vehicle, not discovering the missing child for five or six miles. Upon discovery, they reasoned that it was already too late for the little one; he must surely have already succumbed to an Indian's tomahawk by this point. The family collectively made a decision to keep moving toward the middle of the state. The little boy indeed survived and was still alive at the time of the writing of the account (1846).⁷ Another woman, realizing she had forgotten her baby, rushed back into her house to retrieve the child; but in her panicked fright, she snatched up a stick of firewood instead, while the baby remained asleep peacefully near the fireplace.⁸

The crop-damaging stampeding of livestock, compounded by the disruption of the harvest due to absent farmers, was quite costly to downstate Ohio. Meanwhile, Captain Drake eventually succeeded in calling his company to order, and the next day the entire unit marched on to Sandusky, not knowing the extent of the damage Drake's practical joke had wrought on his home state.⁹

There was also a measure of randomness to the violent incidents in the lower Midwest. In Erie County, Ohio, there was a citizen blockhouse on what was known as the "Parker Farm" that was used as a place of refuge for the surrounding citizenry. A unit of local militia was also based in this blockhouse as a source of added protection. In the fall of 1812, two young militiamen, apprehending no danger on a pleasant autumn morning, left the blockhouse to harvest the honey from a beehive they had spotted in a hollow tree not far from the fort. While in the midst of cutting into the tree, they were surprised by a group

of Indians. One militiaman named Seymour was killed immediately. The second was recognized by one of the group of Indians, taken captive, and retained by the tribe under relatively pleasant circumstances.¹⁰

The next incident is perhaps the best documented and most notorious of all the actions that occurred in Ohio during this particular period.¹¹ Martin Ruffner and a servant, Levi Berkinhizer lived very close to what is now Mifflin, Ohio. Within two miles of the Ruffner cabin stood the home of the Zimmer (also known as the “Seymour”) family, consisting of the elderly Zimmer couple (Frederick and wife), daughter Catherine, young son Philip, and Michael Ruffner, brother of Martin, who had been hired by Zimmer to assist on the farm. On September 10, 1812, Martin Ruffner sent Levi to a local creek to gather their cows for evening milking. Upon locating the cows, he was hailed by a group of perhaps eight to ten Native Americans, who questioned him about the local residents. Being suspicious of the Indians’ intent, Levi quickly ran back to Martin Ruffner and advised him of the circumstances. Martin mounted Levi on a fleet horse and directed him to ride quickly to the Zimmer home to alert this family to the danger. Upon Levi’s arrival, Philip Zimmer was dispatched to the Rev. Mr. James Copus’s cabin, while Levi Berkinhizer moved on to John Lambright’s cabin. Philip Zimmer, Copus, Berkinhizer, and Lambright then all returned to the Zimmer cabin, where they found the elderly Zimmer couple, Catherine Zimmer, and Michael Ruffner all slain. Apparently the Zimmers had spread an evening meal for the Indians, but sometime during the supper, the Indians had killed the family. It was also apparent that Michael Ruffner had put up quite a struggle before he expired, as he exhibited several ghastly bullet-and-tomahawk-inflicted wounds.

Subsequently, James Copus and family retired to a local blockhouse, which was then occupied by a squad of local militia as well. On September 15th, Rev. Copus decided to move back to his cabin, believing he had little to fear now from the Native Americans. Militia commander Captain Martin advised against this move. Failing to prevail upon Copus to stay at the blockhouse, Martin sent a squad of nine men to escort the Copus family back to their cabin. The group journeyed to the farm and found it intact, so the Copus family settled into the cabin while the soldiers occupied the barn for the evening. Near morning, several soldiers walked to a nearby stream to wash. A group of Indians attacked them there, and three soldiers – George Shipley, John Tedrick, and Robert Warnock – were killed in a running gun battle extending all the way back to the homestead. At the cabin, during the ensuing gunfight, Rev. Copus was killed; his daughter Nancy Copus and militiamen George Dye and George Launtz were wounded. After approximately five hours, the Indians retreated, slaughtering a flock of sheep belonging to Copus as they retired.¹²

This entire area of north-central Ohio was subject to much violence during this period. At nearly this same time, in Erie County, Ohio, on the Huron River, a Mr. Putnam and the entire family of Mr. D.P. Snow (except Mr. Snow himself, who was absent from the farm), a total of thirteen persons – mostly children – were attacked and captured. Mrs. Snow and between one and four children were killed, while the rest were carried into Canada as prisoners.¹³

To quell the repeated barbarities in this area, militia General Simon Perkins of Warren, with a regiment of inexperienced militia, was posted at “Fort Avery,” a hastily constructed fort on the east bank of the Huron River near the present town of Milan, Ohio. Perkins had early mobilized his regiment after the outbreak of the war, without waiting for governmental orders; hence, his troops were gathered and ready for an early response to the frontier depredations.¹⁴ From Fort Avery, Perkins’ troops conducted patrols. However, the small number of poorly-trained troops, combined with a high level of activity by hostile Indians, rendered the area a continued hotbed of violence until after Perry’s victory on Lake Erie on September 10, 1813.¹⁵

The attacks and violence were not limited to Ohio. On September 16, 1812, on the southern Indiana/ Illinois frontier, a Potawatomi war party in the area of the Wabash River known as “The Narrows” struck the home of a settler named Isaac Hutson. The party killed Mrs. Hutson and their four children while Isaac was not home. This became known as the “LaMotte Prairie Massacre.”¹⁶ Shortly thereafter on September 21, 1812, in what is now current Palestine, Illinois, Indians burned an uninhabited citizen strongpoint, Fort LaMotte.¹⁷

Two additional areas were hotbeds of mutual destruction between Euro-Americans and Native Americans. The area around Mansfield, Ohio was home to a peaceful group of Delawares. They resided in a village about twelve miles southeast of Mansfield known as Greentown. In August, 1812, as a purported measure of safety for this friendly, peaceful group, the residents of Greentown were gathered in the blockhouse at Mansfield, ostensibly to forward them to an area around Piqua, Ohio, where they reputedly would be safer (we will hear more about the sad fate of this group shortly). Housed at Mansfield, an older Indian and his daughter, preferring freedom, escaped the confines of the blockhouse. While in flight, they had the misfortune to be intercepted by two frontier guides (referred to as “spies” in those days) named Morrison and McColloch. The commander of the Mansfield militia, Captain Kratzer, had issued orders that any Indians found outside the environs of Mansfield should be shot upon sight as hostile because (to Kratzer’s apparently incomplete knowledge) all friendly Indians had been gathered at the blockhouse. Morrison duly shot and heavily wounded the old warrior; the girl escaped. Morrison then called upon his companion, McColloch (a notorious Indian-hater who made it his practice to kill all Indians he encountered – friendly or hostile – after having previously lost three brothers to marauding Indian bands) to finish the job. The merciless McColloch placed his foot on the neck of the helpless, prostrate Indian, and with two swings of his tomahawk smashed the warrior’s skull.¹⁸ Such was the horrific nature of the violence in the lower Old Northwest frontier during the summer and fall of 1812.

Unfortunately, the Greentown Delawares were removed to another hotbed of EuroAmerican/Native American violence: west-central Ohio. Colonel John Johnston maintained the Indian agency for Ohio at Piqua. Approximately six thousand friendly Shawnees, Delawares, Wyandottes, Ottawas, Senecas, Munsees, and Mohicans lived in close proximity to this settlement, under the care of the

United States government. Johnston was a very efficient administrator, but even his outstanding skills could not prevent violence from breaking out periodically. In fact, precisely because of his services, he was a special target of the British-allied Native Americans lurking in the area. Indians hostile to the United States wanted to lure these six thousand friendly Indians away from American influence, and they knew their chances of doing this were slim as long as the fair and efficient Colonel Johnston remained at his post in Piqua. Thus, the British-allied Indians in west-central Ohio mounted efforts to assassinate him. Johnston made a regular circuit of his agency on at least a daily basis. One day a hit-squad of three Indians awaited his passing at an outcropping of bushes adjacent to the road he frequently travelled. Their presence was discovered by a group of Delaware women, who subsequently sounded the alarm. The assassins fled but, disappointed in missing their target, took revenge by killing local civilians Mr. and Mrs. Dilbone and David Gerrard. It was later revealed that the leader of the assassination squad was Pash-e-towa, who shortly before had been a leader of the attack on Pigeon Roost, Indiana, about which we will learn more later.¹⁹

This attempt on Colonel Johnston's life angered the soldiers in his garrison at Piqua. Johnston had early equipped the friendly Native Americans under his supervision with white flags, bearing wording that was intended to guarantee their safe passage around the area. However, the enraged Piqua garrison collected retribution for the death of the Dilbones and Gerrard from the friendly Indians at Piqua. They callously fired into a Native American group who were fully displaying their white flags, killing two, wounding three, and robbing all of their valuable possessions. The soldiers then forwarded their ill-gotten booty further westward to Greenville – another hotbed of violence in west-central Ohio – to mask the crime. Colonel Johnston nevertheless got wind of the travesty and determined to make the trip to Greenville to retrieve the friendly Native Americans' property and restore it to its rightful owners. He bravely made this trip alone, knowing he was riding into an area where hostile Indians had just killed two girls near Greenville. Johnston successfully made the round trip and restored a measure of restitution to the wrongly-accosted friendly Native Americans.²⁰

It could be assumed that once Harrison's forts were established in northwest Ohio, hostile Native American attacks would end. However, although it seems likely from my own vantage point in time that these attacks did in fact ease, hostile acts still did occur – and the forts seemed a magnet for these attacks. Two incidents will illustrate this.

Captain Robert McClelland commanded at Fort McArthur, a bastion on Hull's Trace utilized as a forwarding point for supplies to be used in Harrison's northern offensive. One day in 1812, a soldier under McClelland's command went outside the walls a short distance to engage in peeling bark from a tree for some later use. While he was so employed, two Indians hiding nearby shot simultaneously and each struck the soldier with a musket ball. The soldier screamed in agony and made a very rapid run toward the stockade, but fell and expired before reaching the fort's gate. The fort's garrison immediately stood to arms, as an attack on the fort long had been anticipated. Captain McClelland quickly gathered a squad and left the

protection of the fort to affect a rescue of the unfortunate soldier, but was too late. He then completed such a rapid, determined, and aggressive search of the fort's surrounding environs that the snipers were convinced to retreat.²¹

Somewhat later, perhaps in the late winter of 1813, Captain William Oliver and an accompanying Kentucky militiaman were dispatched from Fort Meigs to Fort Findlay, a distance of thirty-three miles, on an errand of importance. It was 9 o'clock in the evening when they departed, and they had only gone a few miles when they stumbled onto an encampment of hostile Native Americans. The Indians immediately grabbed their weapons and made for them. Oliver and his companion reined their mounts into the brush of a fallen tree, and the horses – perhaps sensing the peril in which both they and their riders were embroiled – remained perfectly silent and still. The Indians passed directly around the tree but failed to discover its inhabitants. The American duo quickly spurred their horses into a gallop and raced to Fort Findlay, arriving badly bruised and with their clothing in tatters from the rough country through which they had dashed. They had no more than entered the fort's portal in safety and the gates swung shut behind them when the Indians arrived. Their attack on the two American dispatch riders had been foiled by a matter of moments.²²

Military Activities Subsequent to the Fall of the Northern Forts

As noted previously, the fall of Forts Michilimackinac, Dearborn, and Detroit in mid-summer 1812 had a profound effect on the lower Midwest. Subsequent to an approximate three-week interval after the fall of Detroit, four coordinated attacks on American outposts occurred. The first was the Pigeon Roost Massacre, on September 3, 1812. According to the best information available, a band of Shawnee, Delaware, and Potawatomi Indians first attacked the cabin of Elias Payne, killing Payne, his wife, seven children, and Payne's brother-in-law, Isaac Coffman.²³ Next struck was the abode of Henry Collings. Henry, his pregnant wife, his brother, Richard Colling's, wife, and seven children were all killed in the attack.²⁴ Reputedly, William Collings killed four of the raiders as they attacked the Henry Collings household. John Biggs's wife, a sister of William Collings, determined that the raiding party was approaching and, with her children, fled to a nearby thicket. After burning the cabin, the Native Americans searched the area for the family, eventually finding the thicket. An infant child began to whimper softly, and Mrs. Biggs had no choice but to silence the child by stuffing her shawl into the baby's mouth. The Indians failed to discover the family, but the infant perished from suffocation.²⁵ Of the Euro-American settlers, nine adults and fifteen children died in the massacre, while four of the attackers were killed by defenders of the village.²⁶

The frontier did not have long to wait before the next act occurred. Just one day later on September 4th, 1812, Fort Harrison, a small outpost containing a garrison of only fifty soldiers, thirty-five of whom were ill, plus another five healthy settlers, was attacked. The assaulting force was approximately six hundred Miami, Potawatomi, Kickapoo, and Winnebago warriors. In the late evening of the 4th, a warrior

crawled up to the fort's blockhouse and set it on fire. He was discovered and the sentries fired on him. At that point, the remainder of the Indian force attacked the west side of the fort.²⁷ A mere few of the fort's defenders were able to be spared to battle the blaze; thus, the fort's supply of whisky, stored in the blockhouse, ignited and the conflagration flared out of control. Captain Zachery Taylor, the fort's commanding officer, organized a bucket brigade while simultaneously combatting the attacking Native Americans and miraculously brought the fire under control.²⁸ However, the now-extinguished fire had left a twenty-foot hole in the outer wall, and Taylor moved to seal the gap. He armed all remaining invalids, while the healthy soldiers built a five-foot-high breastwork to seal the gap. The repairs were completed by daybreak on September 5th.²⁹ However, the garrison had lost most of its food supply and faced starvation as the Native American force settled in for a siege of the fort.³⁰ A force of Indiana Rangers, U.S. 7th Infantry, and local militia, led by Colonel William Russell, was passing near the area and was diverted to the fort. The mounted group reached Fort Harrison on September 12th and the siege was lifted.³¹

Two other battles were associated with the relief effort for Fort Harrison. During the siege of the fort, Captain Taylor sent two men to Fort Knox at Vincennes to report on the battle and to return with supplies.³² On September 13th, 1812, near the close of the siege, Lieutenant Fairbanks was returning to Fort Harrison with a wagon bearing flour and meat (driven by a teamster named John Black) and an escort of thirteen soldiers of the 7th Infantry. At a place known locally as "The Narrows," the supply column was attacked by a war party of Potawatomis. Only two people, Private Edward Purdue (wounded) and wagoner Black, survived the attack.³³ A soldier named Ingram was reputed to have fought valiantly in defense of the column, killing two or three Native American attackers before himself succumbing to superior numbers.³⁴

Two days later, September 15th, 1812, a second relief and supply column consisting of two wagons and fifteen soldiers under Lieutenant Richardson was heading north from Vincennes to Fort Harrison using the same route and unaware that anything was amiss with the first column. The Potawatomis learned of this supply mission and set up the same ambush at the same location. After the first rush by the warriors, Richardson realized he was outmanned; he ordered the wagons to be abandoned and the soldiers to retreat. While this possibly saved lives, the army column still suffered seven killed and one badly wounded.³⁵

On September 5, 1812, Fort Madison, Iowa was the focus of a coordinated attack by Native American forces. The siege was so effective that the fort was nearly overrun. A measure of the intensity of the battle was that several of the buildings in the fort were significantly damaged, and the assault was only lifted when cannon fire from the fort destroyed a central Native American assault position.³⁶

The final assault in the rapid-fire Native American offensive of early September, 1812 was the battle and subsequent siege of Fort Wayne, Indiana. After the fall of Fort Dearborn, Fort Wayne became the northwestern-most outpost of Harrison's northern line. It would eventually become the far-left bastion of this line in late-1812/early-1813, with Fort Defiance/Fort Winchester representing the center and Fort Meigs/Fort Stephenson becoming the right. Fort Wayne occupied a lonely salient on the left – far removed

from Fort Harrison to its southwest, tiny Fort Adams to the southeast on its St. Marys River lifeline, and crumbling Fort Defiance to its east down the Maumee River. This surely made Fort Wayne an inviting target for the late-summer Indian offensive.

The attack was not long in coming. On September 5th, Native Americans who had gathered around Fort Wayne attacked and severely wounded two soldiers returning to the fort from an outhouse outside the walls (these soldiers later passed away from their wounds).³⁷ This initiated a general attack by the Indians on the east wall of the fort, accompanied by the burning of outlying structures. Part of the attack was a ruse in which the Native Americans constructed two fake cannons from hollow logs to appear to have artillery with which to assault the fort.

Fort commander Captain James Rhea, a survivor of the Battle of the Upper Wabash and by now an alcoholic, retired “ill” to his quarters at the height of the battle.³⁸ Resident Indian agent Benjamin Stickney, along with Lieutenants Daniel Curtis and Philip Ostrander, assumed command of the defense of the fort.³⁹ Potawatomi Chief Winnemac entered the fort during an evening cease fire to seek the fort’s surrender, but was rebuffed after an internal confrontation. Following the end of the cease fire at approximately 8:00 PM, the Indian attack resumed, with approximately 70 garrison soldiers and a handful of civilians defending against about 500⁴⁰ or 600⁴¹ Miami and Potawatomi assailants. The garrison defenders kept the walls wet, and returned the Indians’ shooting with effective musket and howitzer fire of their own. The gun battle raged all night and until three o’clock on the afternoon of September 6th, when the Indians retired to regroup.⁴² The battle resumed at nine o’clock that night.⁴³

General William Henry Harrison heard the news of the impending attack on Fort Wayne while at Newport Barracks, Kentucky (across the Ohio River from Cincinnati). He quickly gathered 2,200 Kentucky militiamen in the process of being organized at Newport and raced north.⁴⁴ By September 8th he was at old Fort St. Marys and shortly thereafter was joined by 800 Ohio Militia commanded by Colonel George Adams at Shane’s Crossing (now Rockford, Ohio).⁴⁵

On September 11th, Winnemac attempted one last assault on Fort Wayne, but was repelled with several casualties. On September 12th, as the lead elements of Harrison’s army approached from the southeast on the Piqua Road, the Native American forces broke off the attack, crossed the Maumee River, and disappeared.⁴⁶ The final attack in the Native American offensive of September, 1812 was over.

There is one interesting sub-story associated with the battle and siege of Fort Wayne. Soon after the fall of Detroit, assistant trade factor Stephen Johnston was killed about a mile from Fort Wayne, on August 28th, 1812.⁴⁷ The news was forwarded to Indian Agent John Johnston at Piqua, Ohio, and was received with dismay. Colonel Johnston quickly recognized the danger to the overall settlement of Fort Wayne, particularly the many women and children in that immediate area. Johnston duly called all the Shawnee chiefs present at Piqua together, explained the situation, and asked for volunteers to make the trip northwest on the Piqua Road to affect an evacuation of the civilians. Shawnee Captain Logan immediately

volunteered to lead a group of warriors on the mission. Mounted volunteers among the assembled Shawnees quickly stepped forward, the round trip through hostile territory was rapidly accomplished, and many innocent bystanders to the hostilities were safely borne to Piqua, out of danger.⁴⁸

William Henry Harrison certainly had much to consider after the Indian onslaught of September, 1812. In the past year, he had seen Tecumseh's confederation raise between 350 and 1,000⁴⁹ warriors at Prophetstown and had witnessed that Indian army inflict 38 dead and 150⁵⁰ wounded on *his* 1,000⁵¹-man army at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Harrison had been unsure enough of the finality of his victory at Tippecanoe that he had kept his men under arms and on alert for 36 hours after the battle.⁵² He had seen the Indian confederation raise: a significant war party to attack Pigeon Roost; 600 warriors to attack Fort Harrison; 200 to attack Fort Madison; and another 600 to attack Fort Wayne.⁵³ This was a significant hostile force immediately to his west. Harrison knew he had to build a supply chain through northwest Ohio to enable him to attack the British along the Detroit River, and he certainly had to recognize the threat this enemy force represented to the left flank of his supply line. In fact, he acknowledged this in his correspondence of the time, as he contemplated a series of retaliatory raids in response to the Indians' early September Offensive:

*"The situation ... as it regards one line of operations...would render a measure of this kind highly proper...the Indians...will direct all their efforts against fort Wayne, and the convoys which are to follow the left wing of the army. ... they can... ascertain the period, at which every convoy may set out from St. Marys, and with certainty intercept it on its way to the Miami [Maumee] Rapids. – Harrison."*⁵⁴

The United States had begun building a large force to reinforce Hull's Northwestern Army at Detroit. With the surrender of Detroit and this besieged army, these reinforcement troops were now available for reassignment. The following is a list of units assembled along the Ohio River in southern Ohio (and farther west) in the summer and fall of 1812:

<u>Reinforcements diverted to Indiana and Ohio after the Fall of Detroit:</u> ⁵⁵		<u>#:</u>	<u>Assignment:</u>
Brigadier General Anselm Tupper	Ohio Mounted Militia Regiment	1,200	Maumee River
Brigadier General John Payne			
Lt. Colonel John Allen	Kentucky Regiment (1 st Ky. Rifles)	600	Forks/Wabash
Lt. Colonel William Lewis	Kentucky Regiment (5 th Ky.)	675	Forks/ Wabash
Captain William Gerrard	Kentucky Dragoons Company	80	Forks/ Wabash
Lt. Colonel John Scott	Kentucky Regiment (1 st Ky.)	475	Elkhart:5 Medal
Brigadier General Samuel Wells	17 th U.S. Infantry Regiment	250	Elkhart:5 Medal
Colonel Richard M. Johnson	Kentucky Mounted Militia Regiment	450	Elkhart:5 Medal
Colonel George Adams	Ohio Mounted Militia Regiment	700	Elkhart:5 Medal
Lt. Colonel James Simrall	Kentucky Dragoons	320	Eel River
Colonel Farrow ⁵⁶	Mounted Riflemen Company	-	Eel River
Later:			
Colonel Allen Trimble	Kentucky Mounted Militia	250	Eel River
Captain George Trotter, Jr.	Kentucky Vol Lt Dragoons (6 month)	-	Eel River
From Piqua:			
Major Gen. Wm. Henry Harrison	Kentucky militia	1,000+	White Pigeon's Town (aborted)
From St. Mary's:			
Colonel James Findlay	Ohio Militia	350	Ottawa villages
From Dayton/Greenville: ⁵⁷			
Lt. Colonel William Campbell	Cmdr.: 19 th U.S. Infantry Regiment	600	Mississinewa
Lt. Colonel James Simrall			
Captain Trotter	Kentucky Vol Lt Dragoons (6 month)		
Cornet Lee	Michigan Vol Lt Dragoons (12 month)		
Captain Warren	Pennsylvania Rifles Lt Dragoons		
Captain Butler	Pittsburgh Blues Vol Infantry (12 month)		
Major James Ball			
Captain Hopkins	2 nd U.S. Light Dragoons		
Captain Garrard	Kentucky Vol Lt Dragoons (12 month)		
Captain Pierce	Ohio Vol Lt Dragoons (6 month)		
Captain Markle	Pennsylvania Vol Lt Dragoons (12 month)		
Captain Elliott	19 th U.S. Infantry Regiment		
Forces later directed to build the St. Marys/Auglaize River Line (South to North): ⁵⁵		<u>Installation:</u>	
Lt. Colonel Joshua Barbee	Kentucky Regiment (3 rd Ky.?)	500	St Mary's (fort)
Lt. Colonel John Pogue	Kentucky Regiment (4 th Ky.)	575	Ft. Amanda
Lt. Colonel William Jennings	Kentucky Regiment (2 nd Ky.)	600	Ft. Jennings
"Colonel Brown" ⁵⁸	Kentucky Troops?	_____	Ft. Brown
Subtotal		<u>8,625</u>	(approximate)
Two other large contingents of troops massing farther west: ⁵⁹		<u>Assignment:</u>	
General Samuel Hopkins	Kentucky Militia	2,000	Peoria Villages
Colonel William Russell	7 th U.S. Inf./mounted Rangers	<u>300</u>	Peoria Villages
Total		<u>10,925</u>	(approximate)

I note two observations regarding the above troops: 1) Some of the units that took part in the earlier raids in northern Indiana (Captain William Gerrard's *Kentucky Volunteer Light Dragoons* and Lieutenant Colonel James Simrall's *Kentucky Dragoons*) also participated in the later Mississinewa raid and, 2) it appears that the troops which General Harrison gathered at Piqua eventually were assigned to build the St. Marys/Auglaize River line of forts. If you subtract these troops from the total, it appears that the Northwestern command still was able to amass approximately 9,525 troops for offensive use in the Northwestern Theater in the fall of 1812 – a numerically formidable army for that time and place.

How would these troops be used? To deliver a set of telling blows against the Indian villages (mostly in Indiana Territory) that were providing sustenance for war parties that potentially could menace Harrison's northwest Ohio supply chain. The goal was to push the Indians far enough north and west that they could not interdict the western Ohio logistics routes while these routes were being used to build up supplies at the Maumee Rapids for the subsequent push into Michigan Territory and Upper Canada.

Almost as quickly as Harrison's relief regiments arrived in Fort Wayne, they were resupplied, organized, and prepared for punitive missions to destroy Indian villages. On September 14th, 1812 General Harrison organized a division under General Payne, composed of regiments including the 1st Kentucky Rifles (Lt. Col. John Allen), the 5th Kentucky (Lt. Col. William Lewis), and the Kentucky Dragoons Company (Capt. William Gerrard). The destination for this division was the Forks of the Wabash, where Miami chief Pe-She-Wa (Jean Baptiste Richardville) had three important villages⁶⁰ in the vicinity. The division, accompanied by General Harrison, made progress across the "Glorious Gate,"⁶¹ the eight-milelong land portage between the St. Marys and the Petite Rivare ("Little River"), down the Little River, and to the Miami villages at the Forks (current Huntington, IN). As the villages were deserted, no Indians were encountered. The villages and all crops were completely destroyed, and no militia lives were lost.⁶²

The second division was composed of the 17th U.S. Infantry Regiment (Brig. Gen. Samuel Wells), the 1st Kentucky Regiment (Lt. Col. John Scott), the Kentucky Mounted Militia Regiment (Col. Richard Mentor Johnson), and the Ohio Mounted Militia Regiment (Col. George Adams). Its target was the Potawatomi village of Chief Five Metals on the Elkhart River (near present Elkhart, IN). This division had the same operational orders as the first: destroy the village and all harvested crops in the area. The result was also the same as Payne's mission: the village and the crops were destroyed with no battle casualties. There was, however, some sickness and one death on the return trip to Fort Wayne (superstitiously attributed to the looting of an Indian burial vault during the raid). The return to Fort Wayne was accomplished on September 18th.⁶³

Arriving at Fort Wayne hard on the heels of these two divisions was Lt. Col. James Simrall's Kentucky Dragoons, plus a company of mounted riflemen under Colonel Farrow, on September 17th, 1812. These 320 horsemen were tasked with destroying the Miami villages along the Eel River northwest of Fort Wayne. Simrall immediately (September 18th) moved toward the villages, and on the 19th destroyed

everything – all Indian dwellings, crops, and supplies on the river – except those belonging to the heirs of the recently deceased Miami chief Little Turtle (Mishikinoqkwa), who had gone from being an implacable foe to a staunch ally of the U.S. government. The Miamis fled southwest down the Eel River, perhaps making for “The Island,” a traditional 300-acre elevated stronghold of this tribe,⁶⁴ with Simrall’s troopers in hot pursuit. However, in the lowlands just east of The Island on September 19th, the Miami warriors turned, stood, and fought.⁶⁵ It was said that once the battle was over, “...*the river was clogged with dead Indians at that place.*”⁶⁶ An estimated twenty-five-plus Native Americans were killed in the battle.⁶⁷ There were no casualties among the U.S./Kentucky forces. This represented one of only a few pitched battles during the entire Fall, 1812 campaign.

The initial groups of militiamen dispatched for the relief of besieged Fort Wayne had now been forwarded on raids to the north and west of that fortress. However, there were other organized bodies of state militia which were under the control of the Northwest command, and these also went into action during this period. On September 16th, in western Ohio, Colonel James Findlay took his 350 Ohio militiamen first to St. Marys, then north into the Great Black Swamp to the Ottawa villages of Lower Tawas on Tawa Run and Upper Tawas on the Blanchard River. Findlay destroyed these villages because the Ottawas had given aid to British in the area.⁶⁸ This force returned to St. Marys on September 24th.

More mounted troops came to Fort Wayne in early October. Colonel Allen Trimble arrived in Fort Wayne on October 5th at the head of 500 mounted militia and a company of dragoons. Trimble took 250 of these troops on a second raid against the Eel River villages. His troops destroyed two more villages in this locale and returned to Fort Wayne on October 25th.⁶⁹

Two additional raiding forces were massing to the southwest near the Ohio River. Samuel Hopkins, a brigadier general in the Kentucky State Militia, was ordered by William Henry Harrison to command all Indiana and Illinois territorial forces. He duly assembled about 2,000 poorly trained and undisciplined mounted militiamen at Vincennes. Hopkins planned to use this force against the Kickapoo and Peoria Native American villages on the Illinois River, southwest of the now fallen Fort Dearborn (Chicago). Morale among the militia was low as the unit started northwest on October 14th, and the barren terrain, made more unpleasant by harassing brush fires set by the shadowing Indians, caused morale to fall further.⁷⁰ The unit became lost, ran low on food, and stumbled back to Vincennes in exhaustion,⁷¹ arriving there on October 25th, 1812.

A projected companion stroke on the same objective was to be launched from farther west by Illinois Territorial Governor Ninian Edwards. Edwards knew that one of the locations from which the Native Americans had launched their fall offensive was Peoria. There, perhaps one thousand Indian warriors – Kickapoo, Potawatomi, and Piankashaw – had assembled and sallied forth on various raids. Edwards was able to assemble between 300⁷² to 400⁷³ territorial militia near current Edwardsville, IL. He divided his militia into two small regiments, one commanded by Colonel Stephenson and the other under

Major Rector.⁷⁴ Colonel William Russell arrived in command of two companies of U.S. Rangers.⁷⁵ Edwards and Russell rapidly marched their combined units north toward their objective, departing on October 15th. Upon arrival, the mounted juggernaut destroyed two Kickapoo villages at the fork of the Sangamon River, then force-marched to the head of Peoria Lake where they destroyed a large combined Kickapoo and Potawatomi village. Unlike several of the other Euro-American raids, the Native Americans actively opposed the Edwards/Russell raid. Edwards estimated Native American casualties at between 24 and 30 killed, with no loss to the attacking force.⁷⁶ The American force returned to its starting point on October 31, 1812.

Since his return from the abortive raid on Peoria, Territorial General Samuel Hopkins had been recruiting another force for a raid against Prophetstown and some adjacent villages, which reportedly had shown signs of rehabilitation. By November 10th, he had gathered between 1,200⁷⁷ and 1,250⁷⁸ militiamen at Fort Harrison and departed north along the Wabash River, following Harrison's old trail. The force was comprised of three regiments of mounted infantry under [Lt.] Colonels Barbour, Miller, and Wilcox; a small company of regulars under Captain Zachary Taylor; and a company of spies ("scouts") under Captain Washburn.⁷⁹ The expedition reached the Prophetstown area on November 19th.⁸⁰ On this morning, three hundred soldiers under General Butler surrounded a Winnebago town, as well as about 40 surrounding huts, but found all deserted. On the 20th, 21st, and 22nd, the army destroyed this Winnebago town, Tecumseh's Prophetstown, and a third large Kickapoo village nearby,⁸¹ plus all corn crops in the vicinity.⁸² On November 21st, a soldier named Dunn, one of the sentries posted for the evening, was reported missing. The next day (November 22nd), a unit of sixty mounted soldiers under Lt. Colonels Miller and Wilcox⁸³ moved to the east to search for the missing sentry. Between seven and ten miles out, the troopers spotted a hunting party of Indians moving north quickly into a small, broken valley. The mounted unit followed the Native American party up a path leading into the ravine, and soon in the middle of the path they came upon the head of Dunn. The commanders could not control the fury of the troopers, and the unit raced headlong deeper into the valley. Once fully into the ravine, they were assailed by over one hundred Indians. A devastating first volley felled many troopers, several dead before they hit the ground. The troopers were surrounded on three sides, and the ravine walls were too steep to climb.⁸⁴ Captain Little describes the action:

*"We rode on rapidly about a mile and a quarter when we found ourselves among and surrounded by Indians in hundreds, they fired on us in all directions as thick as hail. We immediately found that we were not able to fight them. I was shot through the body near the hip bone. We retreated in every kind of disorder the best way we could. I was still able to ride and got out to camp where we found that we had lost sixteen killed and three wounded."*⁸⁵

General Hopkins wrote in his after-battle report:

“I have no doubt that the ground the Indians have taken was the strongest I have ever seen. The deep, rapid creek was in their rear, running in a semi-circle and fronted by a bluff one hundred feet high, almost perpendicular, and could only be penetrated by three steep ravines. After reconnoitering sufficiently, we returned to camp and found the ice so accumulated as to alarm us for the return of the boats. I had fully intended to have spent one more week in endeavoring to find the Indian camp but the shoeless, shirtless state of the troops now clad in the remnants of their summer dress, a river full of ice, the hills covered with snow, a frigid climate, and no certain point to which we could further direct our operations, under the influence and advice of every staff and field officer, orders were given and measures pursued for our return on the 25th.⁸⁶

Hopkins’ command returned to Fort Harrison on November 30th. However, there is one additional military skirmish which may be associated with this second campaign against Prophetstown on the Tippecanoe River. The account⁸⁷ describing this action states that this battle took place when soldiers “were marching on foot on their way to Fort Knox from the battle of Tippecanoe.”⁸⁸ A Lieutenant Morrison and his squad of men were walking south through that area between Forts Harrison and Knox commonly known as “The Narrows,” of which we have already read of three previous ambushes in this essay. The squad was being guided by a friendly Indian named Little Eyes. The unit members had killed a deer that evening just before sundown. This must have aroused some caution within the guide, because he told the soldiers that they would be attacked soon. When the time arrived to camp for the evening, Little Eyes informed the group that he would not encamp with them, then moved off some distance to hide in a hollow log. Later that evening, the squad heard grunting noises, such as that made by pigs. The grunting was an imitation of hogs, because in fact it was a group of attacking Indians, who once they got into firing range, unleashed a volley of gunfire into the soldiers’ encampment. The fusillade killed four soldiers instantly and an additional one who ran a short distance before expiring.⁸⁹

(An interesting aside accompanied this 1884 account of the ambush: *“The ground where Morrison's camp was made is now inside a cultivated field, and should be bought by the State, and properly fenced, and a monument erected thereon, and also the ground where the Fairbanks massacre took place should be carefully designated in the same way.*

In a few more years, if nothing is done, these places as well as these circumstances will only be preserved in conflicting traditions, and the names of those heroes of that eventful period will become unknown, and they will be unhonored, unwept and unsung. The early pioneers and heroes of those times deserve the Grateful remembrance of succeeding [.] generations for their arduous toils and self-denying sacrifices. May it ever be awarded to them! Peace to their ashes.)⁹⁰

We now come to the last and possibly most eventful of Major General William Henry Harrison’s counteroffensive raids in the Fall of 1812. Harrison was convinced that many of the Indians who conducted the attack and siege of Fort Wayne were based at the Native American village of Mississineway, near the junction of the Wabash and Mississinewa Rivers. He therefore planned to reduce this set of villages in much the similar manner as the other operations he had coordinated that autumn. (see Essay # 8: “The Battle of Mississinewa: A Battle in a Major Western Campaign in the War of 1812” for a detailed account of this

operation.) Lieutenant Colonel John B. Campbell was given command of the mission. He raised 600 troops at Franklinton (now Columbus) Ohio, and on November 25th he proceeded west through Springfield to Xenia, where the troops were mustered into service and paid.⁹¹ The force stopped again at Dayton, where pack horses were secured for the expedition.⁹² The unit staged through old Fort Greeneville, and on December 14th, it left there for the trek northwest to the Mississineway villages. Very early on the morning of December 17th, the mounted troopers were informed by advanced scouts that the first of the villages was very near. The troopers quickly swooped down on the village, killing eight Indians and capturing forty-two prisoners. A force then moved west for a couple of miles, burning two more villages but encountering no more Indians. This detachment rejoined the main body and the entire group bedded down in a square, semi-fortified camp for the night. Just before daylight on December 18th, the camp was attacked by an estimated three hundred Native Americans. A relatively intense two-hour battle ensued in which ten EuroAmericans were killed and forty-eight wounded (two of whom subsequently died). Over one hundred horses were killed. An estimated forty additional Native Americans were killed.⁹³ The loss of the horses made the transport of the entire group back to Fort Greeneville slow, difficult, and painful in the deep snow and frigid temperatures. As a result of the battle and the severe cases of frostbite incurred on the return trip, a total of 303 troopers were declared unfit for further duty⁹⁴ upon the unit's arrival at Greeneville on December 25th.⁹⁵

Analysis of the raid has provided mixed results. Holliday noted that the expedition never got closer than twenty miles to the principal Mississineway village, and the small villages the troopers did burn were not threats to Harrison. No food stores were destroyed, and the corn that was captured was immediately fed to the horses – many of whom were killed the next day. Further, the force suffered a sixty percent casualty rate at the completion of the raid, when the severe frostbite cases were added.⁹⁶ And yet, another commentator stated: “The Mississinewa Expedition was the most successful of Harrison’s military actions in the fall of 1812. It eliminated the Mississinewa River area as a haven for Indian resistance, restored the people’s confidence in the army, and secured the route of Harrison’s army for the recapture of Fort Detroit.”⁹⁷ Perhaps the best conclusion is that this expedition’s completion was an important component of Harrison’s overall strategy to push the Native American confederacy away from the crucial western Ohio supply routes.

Other military or quasi-military actions in the Fall of 1812.

This essay would not be complete without describing three other small battles that occurred in northwest Ohio in this Fall 1812 period. Although these battles were not related to Harrison’s orchestrated campaign against the Native Americans to protect his western Ohio supply routes, two of the three are related to his overall “big-picture” campaign to retake Detroit and defeat the combined British/Native American confederacy.

Regular U.S Army Brigadier General James Winchester arrived at Fort Wayne on September 18th, 1812, the same day as General Payne's and General Wells' divisions returned from their respective northern Indiana raids. At this point there was some dispute as to who was commander of the Northwestern Theater, as Winchester was a regular army brigadier general, while Harrison was a Kentucky militia major general. To both men's credit, they agreed on a temporary expedient while the command situation was sorted out. Winchester assumed command of a force of four regiments (essentially a division of that time) of troops to begin the move down (northeast) the Maumee River toward the Maumee Rapids (now Perrysburg, OH), which would be the intermediate jumping off point for a move to recapture Detroit. Meanwhile, Harrison moved back up the St. Marys River (southeast) and other associated land bridges/ waterways to Piqua to organize the additional American forces congregating there.⁹⁸

Winchester's force was comprised of Samuel Wells' command (essentially a full regiment [for the time]) of three companies of the U.S. 17th Infantry Regiment and one company of the U.S. 19th Infantry Regiment, the 1st Kentucky Rifle Regiment (Lt. Col. John Allen), the 1st Kentucky Regiment (Lt. Col. John M. Scott), and the 5th Kentucky Regiment (Lt. Col. William Lewis).⁹⁹ Altogether the division numbered perhaps well over 1,000 men.¹⁰⁰ This force made steady progress (5 to 6 miles per day) down the Maumee, and by September 25th,¹⁰¹ it was perhaps fifteen to twenty miles southwest of old Fort Defiance (current Defiance, Ohio).

Meanwhile the British military command in Fort Malden, Upper Canada, received word of the Native American siege of Fort Wayne and determined to support it with reinforcements sent southwest up the Maumee River. This reinforcement was comprised of 50 regulars of the British 41st Regiment of Foot, 150 militiamen, 800 Native Americans under the influential Wyandot chief Roundhead, and three pieces of artillery to be used for the reduction of Fort Wayne.¹⁰² Overall commander of the force was British Major Adam Muir of the 41st Regiment. The division departed Fort Malden on September 14th and made similar steady progress. By September 25th it had moved its cannons up to the site of old Fort Defiance,¹⁰³ and the British/Native American force was in the immediate vicinity of that installation.

From the current vantage point of time it appears that a collision and battle between two substantial opposing forces somewhere southwest of Defiance was in the offing, but it would be avoided. Both sides had sent out advance scouts to reconnoiter the route ahead. The opposing squads of scouts skirmished at The Bend of the Maumee, approximately seven miles west of old Fort Defiance. The American army scouts (consisting of Ensign James Liggett [17th U.S. Infantry Regiment] and four members of the 1st Kentucky Rifle Regiment [Wyatt Stepp, Guy Hinton, William Bevis, and Nathaniel Mitchell]) were surprised and killed. Subsequently, two American relief parties were sent out to find them but were ambushed by British/Indian forces. In the course of these skirmishes, the alliance force captured Quartermaster Sergeant Alexander McCoy, who told his captors that General Winchester was moving down the Maumee with between 3,000¹⁰⁴ and 9,000¹⁰⁵ soldiers. Muir attempted to engineer several defensive positions to slow or

engage Winchester's force, but word of the reputed size of the American army gradually filtered through the allied camp, and the Native American contingent melted away. This eventually induced Muir to retreat to Detroit.¹⁰⁶

During this period, there was an example of the sectarian violence that plagued the lower Northwest Territory in the midst of the on-going war. A British-allied Delaware chief named Sac-o-manc arrived at the foot of the Maumee Rapids, and was conversant with the relatively neutral settlers that still resided there at that time. He made clear that his intention was to continue on into the interior of Ohio. He remained at the Rapids for a day and then departed south. When Sac-o-manc returned a few days later, he displayed three scalps he had taken to a Rapids resident. He also described the details of how they were acquired during his time in the interior of Ohio at Owl Creek, near Mount Vernon.¹⁰⁷

The next battle to be profiled was one of the more unusual battles of the War of 1812. The overall sequence of confrontations is known as the "Skirmish on the Peninsula," and it took place over three or four days, depending on how the beginning and end of the actions are defined.¹⁰⁸ Both local militia and more organized Ohio Militia were involved against an estimated total of 130 Potawatomi warriors. On September 28th, 1812, four scows loaded with dried beef and pork were being rowed across Sandusky Bay by eighteen Ohio militiamen. A sudden storm forced them back to the Marblehead Peninsula to Bull's Island (now known as Johnson Island). Once there, the militia noticed signs of Indian activity and decided to scout the peninsula to determine how many Native Americans were included in the total number.¹⁰⁹ The militia counted forty-seven Indians within their view and decided this was much more than they could successfully assail. The Ohio Militia unit quietly made its way back to the boats, rowed across Sandusky Bay to Cedar Point, then rowed up the Huron River to Camp (Fort) Avery. Very early on the morning of September 29th, the commander of Camp Avery assembled seventy-two volunteers to go back to the Marblehead Peninsula and attack the Potawatomi raiding party. The force reached the Peninsula during the early daylight hours and organized into three wings as they began their march across the spit of land.¹¹⁰

After advancing just short of a mile, the militia came to a field of tall grass. A war party of Indians rose up directly in front of them and delivered a devastating volley. Several of the militiamen were felled immediately, but the militia returned the fire in kind. The firefight lasted approximately 15 minutes before dying out. The American groups became separated during the fighting, and at its conclusion, the lead group noted a small squad of Indians moving west along a nearby road. Despite their fellow militia recognizing the makings of a trap and shouting for them to stop, the lead group of soldiers rashly pursued the Indians. Once on the road, this group was ambushed by other Native Americans hiding in adjacent trees which had been newly felled in the recent storm. Another group of Indians also appeared to hinder the militiamen from retreating successfully to the bay. This firing continued until the right wing appeared to relieve the besieged center. The fire of the Potawatomis then slowed significantly and allowed a phased withdrawal. Ohio Militia Captain Joshua T. Cotton directed a group of soldiers to a nearby log house which was surrounded by clear

fields of fire and could be successfully defended. About thirty other militiamen (some of whom were wounded) reached the boats and this group was able to reach Fort Avery that evening. Thirty-seven of the militia were left stranded in defensive positions on the Marblehead Peninsula.¹¹¹

After 1:00 A.M. on September 30th, the boats reached an advanced post on the Huron River and an assistant surgeon treated the wounded. Sergeant Rice moved on to Camp Avery to inform the post of the thirty-seven stranded soldiers on the Marblehead Peninsula. Sickness at the fort caused its garrison to be unable to respond to the crisis, but two officers set out to effect a rescue.¹¹² These officers gathered fourteen additional volunteers along the way to assist in the rescue effort. When they arrived at the peninsula, they found that the survivors had been able to concentrate from various locations and move to the shore during a lull in the siege of the cabin. When they had been loaded into the boats and evacuated, the series of marches and battles subsequently known as the “Skirmish on the Peninsula” was over.¹¹³

The two skirmishes on September 29th, 1812 became known collectively as the Battle of the Marblehead Peninsula. Reportedly killed in the battle were seven Euro-Americans (James S. Bills, Daniel Mingus, Simon Blackman, Matthew Guy, Abraham Simons, Valentine Ramsdall, and Alexander Mason.) Nine were wounded (Jacob Frank, James Jack, Moses Eldred, Elias Spoony, Samuel B. Turner, John Carlton, Samuel Mann, John McMahon, and a man whose last name was “Lee.”) Captain Cotton learned in Detroit from a Native American participant in the Battle of Marblehead Peninsula after the war that forty Indians had been killed in the battles.¹¹⁴

A sad follow-up to the Battle of Marblehead Peninsula occurred shortly thereafter. John McMahon was wounded in his side in the battle, and upon evacuation, he recovered at Camp Avery. At his full recovery in November 1812, he was discharged and started to make his way home alone. McMahon followed what was known as the “old portage,” but during the trek he met a group of hostile Indians in what is now Trumbull County and was killed by them.¹¹⁵

The final battle to be discussed in this essay was an offshoot of Harrison’s overall strategic offensive in the Northwestern Theater. When British Major Adam Muir retreated before American General Winchester’s advance down the Maumee River, he retreated all the way past the Maumee Rapids to the Detroit/Fort Malden/Sandwich area. At that locale, the crush of British soldiers, Canadian militia, and Native American warriors plus their families put pressure on the available food sources. General Procter and Major Muir knew there was a large supply of unharvested corn in the abandoned fields at the Maumee Rapids. Procter thus authorized a force of seventy-five British Regulars and four hundred Native Americans under Matthew Elliott to move to the Rapids, secure the corn, and transport it back to British/Native American lines.¹¹⁶

Meanwhile, Ohio Militia General Edward Tupper had moved his 1,000¹¹⁷ to 1,200¹¹⁸ -man “2nd Ohio Volunteer Brigade” (later known as the “1st Ohio Detachment”) up Hull’s old trace to be based at Fort McArthur (near current Kenton, OH). From that point, Tupper dispatched Captain Hinkson and his

company of spies (i.e.: “scouts”) to reconnoiter the Rapids, the company departing on November 9th. The scouts returned with a report “that there were eighty mounted Indian warriors and fifty British soldiers, two gunboats, six bateau and a schooner at the rapids.” They also captured British officer Captain Clark, who – when interrogated – detailed the purpose of the mission.¹¹⁹ Sickness being rampant at the fort, Tupper gathered the available force of six hundred and fifty mounted soldiers and headed toward the Rapids. When Tupper arrived at the Portage River, about twenty miles south of the Rapids on November 13th, he sent another detachment of scouts ahead. The scouts reported that the opponents were camped on the northwest side of the river and the Indians were drinking heavily. Tupper moved forward to the Rapids on November 14th. The mounted Americans experienced much difficulty crossing the swollen Maumee River at that point.¹²⁰

The brigade withdrew to its camp and reorganized, with Captain Safford commanding the left flank, Colonel Miller the right, and Major Galloway commanding the reserve battalion. At this point the Native Americans attacked a small detachment in advance of the left flank, killing four soldiers. The remainder of the left flank force attacked the Indians, and in a twenty-minute battle turned them back. A second formation of Indians attacked the right flank, but similarly was turned back, the Americans incurring slight casualties while the Indians suffered greatly. As the Native Americans retreated back across the river, the trailing militia soldiers fired upon them, killing and injuring many more. This concluded the battle, and later that evening General Tupper initiated a withdrawal back down Hull’s Trace, the brigade’s provisions and ammunition almost exhausted.¹²¹

This small battle was both a tactical and strategic victory for the United States. Tactically, the Americans withstood the assault and retained the field at the conclusion of the battle. Strategically, the victory forced the British/Native American alliance forces back to their bases without securing either the Rapids as a potential jumping off point into Ohio or the food supply they needed for their armies. The U.S. forces suffered four dead and “a couple” wounded. British/Native American losses are unknown.¹²²

Byron Farwell was one of my favorite historians. A statement in his book, The Great War in Africa, 1914-1918, has always been a watchword for me as I have studied history: “*But interest in a war should not be gauged by the size of the butcher’s bill.*”¹²³ I picked up another quote from a historian for whom I am rapidly gaining respect, John F. Winkler, during the research for this essay: “*The measure of battles is the magnitude of their consequences...*”¹²⁴ Both these quotes are certainly applicable to the activities in the period between July 17th and December 25th, 1812 in the Northwestern Theater of the War of 1812. The combined casualty counts for all sides in these Summer/Autumn ambushes, expeditions, and battles would not have constituted even a significant skirmish in the Napoleonic Wars that were then engulfing Europe. However, in the context of the overall conduct of the War of 1812 in the Northwestern

Theater, the United States' Fall 1812 campaign, coordinated and conducted by General Harrison and his lieutenants, constitutes a significant example of inciteful strategic recognition and efficient tactical execution. It is my opinion that this campaign was completed as an integral part of Harrison's overall plan to defeat the combined British/Native American alliance and secure the Northwest Territory for the United States once and for all. As such, these activities are well worth documenting and analyzing for future historical study.

Endnotes

¹ David Curtis Skaggs, William Henry Harrison and the Conquest of the Ohio Country: Frontier Fighting in the War of 1812 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), p. 108.

² Henry Howe, The Historical Collections of Ohio in Two Volumes. Volume 2. Cincinnati: C.J. Krehbiel & Company, Printers and Binders, Originally Published in 1846; Updated and republished 1888, 1900), pp. 579; 662-663.

³ Henry Howe, The Historical Collections of Ohio in Two Volumes. Volume 1. Cincinnati: C.J. Krehbiel & Company, Printers and Binders, Originally Published in 1846; Updated and republished 1888, 1900), p. 497.

⁴ Ibid., p. 567.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 278-279.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 549-550.

⁷ Ibid., p. 550.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 578-579.

¹¹ This account is derived and paraphrased from Howe, Vol. 1, pp. 256-257; Howe, Vol. 2, p.475; and Ohio Historical Marker #2-3, 2203 State Route 603, Ashland, OH 44805; Latitude 40.88569, Longitude -82.432550.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Howe, Vol. 1, p. 567, 579.

¹⁴ Howe, Vol. 2, p. 673, 675.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 579.

¹⁶ Harold Allison, The Tragic Saga of the Indiana Indians. (Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 1986), p. 190, found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Harrison .

¹⁷ <https://www.northamericanforts.com/East/ilsouth.html#lamotte> (info provided by Tony Treadway, and also by Greg Parrott); also, <https://drloihjournal.blogspot.com/2018/10/fort-lamotte-andfort-foot-palestine-illinois.html> (Compiled by Neil Gale, Ph.D.).

- ¹⁸ Howe, Vol. 2, p. 475.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 254.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 254-255. ²¹ Howe, Vol. 1, p. 878 ²² *Ibid.*, p. 868.
- ²³ Allison, p. 176, found in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeon_Roost_State_Historic_Site
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 177, found in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeon_Roost_State_Historic_Site
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 178, found in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeon_Roost_State_Historic_Site
- ²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pigeon_Roost_State_Historic_Site
- ²⁷ Allison, p. 183, found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Harrison.
- ²⁸ J.E. Kaufmann and H.W. Kaufmann, Tomasz Idzikowski, (illustrator), Fortress America: The Forts that Defended America, 1600 to the Present. (Boston, MA: Da Capo Press, 2004), p. 160; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Harrison.
- ²⁹ Allison, p. 185, found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Harrison.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 186, found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Harrison.
- ³¹ August Derleth, Vincennes: Portal to the West. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 182; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Harrison.
- ³² John W. Spencer, Prof., History Of Greene And Sullivan Counties, Indiana. (Copyright 1884), Chapter 2; found at <http://files.usgwarchives.net/in/sullivan/history/1884/historyo/chapteri361gms.txt> .
- ³³ Spencer, Chapter 2; found at <http://files.usgwarchives.net/in/sullivan/history/1884/history/chapteri361gms.txt>. also, Allison, p.188; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Harrison.
- ³⁴ Allison, p. 189-190, found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Harrison.
- ³⁵ Spencer, Chapter 2; found at <http://files.usgwarchives.net/in/sullivan/history/1884/history/chapteri361gms.txt>..
- ³⁶ Donald Jackson, "A Critic's View of Old Fort Madison." Iowa Journal of History and Politics 58(1), (1960). pp. 31–36; Van der Zee, Jacob, "Old Fort Madison: Some Source Materials". Iowa Journal of History and Politics. 11 (1913), pp. 517–545; Jacob Van der Zee, "Old Fort Madison: Early Wars on the Eastern Border of the Iowa Country". Iowa and War. Iowa City: State Historical Society of Iowa. 7(1918), pp. 1–40; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Madison,_Iowa .
- ³⁷ Allison, p. 202; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 203; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ⁴¹ John F. Winkler, The Thames: The War of 1812 on the Northwest Frontier (Oxford, GB: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2016), p. 31.

- ⁴² Allison, p. 204; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ⁴³ Ibid., p. 205; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 207; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 207; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 209; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 201; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ⁴⁸ Howe, Vol.2, p. 255.
- ⁴⁹ John F. Winkler, Tippecanoe: The Prophet's Battle (Oxford, GB: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2015), p. 34.
- ⁵⁰ Paul O'Neil, The Frontiersmen (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1977), p. 98.
- ⁵¹ Winkler, Tippecanoe, p. 33.
- ⁵² O'Neil, p. 98.
- ⁵³ Winkler, The Thames, p. 31.
- ⁵⁴ Robert Breckinridge McAfee, History of the Late War in the Western Country (Lexington, KY: Worsley & Smith, 1816. Reproduced by Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, Inc., 1966), pp. 177-178. It seems relatively clear that this is part of the verbiage contained in a letter from William Henry Harrison to the Secretary of War, November 10, 1812, in "Harrison's Messages and Letters," II, p. 210.
- ⁵⁵ Unless otherwise noted, the details of this page are from: Winkler, The Thames, p. 14.
- ⁵⁶ Allison, 216; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ⁵⁷ Murray Holliday, The Battle of Mississinewa, 1812 (Marion, IN: Grant County Historical Society. 1964), pp. 14, 29-31.
- ⁵⁸ Information obtained from: 1) a historical marker at the site of Fort Brown, "ERECTED 1953 BY THE PAULDING COUNTY OHIO SESQUICENTENNIAL COMMITTEE, and 2) a monument at the site of Fort Brown, "PRESENTED TO THE STATE OF OHIO IN THE SESQUICENTENNIAL YEAR OF STATEHOOD. BY THE MONUMENT BUILDERS OF OHIO, INC.
- ⁵⁹ Winkler, The Thames, p. 33.
- ⁶⁰ Historical Marker at the intersection of U.S. Highway 24 and Indiana State Highway 9, Huntington, Indiana. The marker is adjacent to and north of the actual physical forks the Wabash River. The historical marker was provided courtesy of the Society of Indiana Pioneers.
- ⁶¹ Historical Marker at the intersection of Lindenwood Avenue and Jefferson Boulevard, Fort Wayne, Indiana. The marker is near what would have been the eastern portal of the "Glorious Gate." The historical marker was provided courtesy of the Allen County-Fort Wayne Historical Society.
- ⁶² Allison, 214; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .
- ⁶³ Allison, 216; found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .

⁶⁴ Historical Marker on Indiana State Route 9, about 3 miles south of Columbia City, Indiana. The historical marker erected by the Whitley County Historical Society – 1950.

⁶⁵ Historical Marker, junction of S. Raber Road, E. Lowrey & Paige Roads at the Eel River bridge, NE corner of Paige Road, 2.8 miles SE of the Whitley County Court House, Whitley County, Indiana. ID#: 92.2001.1. The historical marker was provided courtesy of the Indiana Historical Bureau and Youth of First Presbyterian Church. 2001.

⁶⁶ Pat Radaker, “Historical Marker placed site of Little Turtle’s death.” The Post & Mail, Columbia City, Indiana, May 17, 2001; found at <http://whitleycountyin.org/gswcmisc.htm> .

⁶⁷ <http://indiana.lostsoulsgenealogy.com/battlesfought.htm> .

⁶⁸ Historical Marker at the southwest corner of West Main and South Walnut Streets Ottawa, Ohio. Historical marker was provided by the Ohio Bicentennial Commission, The Longaberger Company, First Bank of Ottawa, Sky Bank, Union Bank, The Putnam County Genealogical Society, and The Ohio Historical Society. Found at <http://www.remarkableohio.org/index.php?/category/1259> .

⁶⁹ Allison, p. 218; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Fort_Wayne .

⁷⁰ Jeanne T. Heidler and Davis S. Heidler, “Samuel Hopkins,” Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1997), p. 243.

⁷¹ Holliday, p. 9.

⁷² <https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/649268>

⁷³ Jeanne T. Heidler and Davis S. Heidler, “Ninian Edwards,” Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1997), p. 164.

⁷⁴ <https://muse.jhu.edu/chapter/649268>

⁷⁵ Heidler and Heidler, “Edwards,” p. 164.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Heidler and Heidler, “Hopkins,” p. 243.

⁷⁸ Winkler, The Thames, p. 35; and Holliday, p. 10.

⁷⁹ J. Wesley Whicker, “The Second Battle of Tippecanoe,” Historical Sketches of the Wabash Valley, 1916; found at <http://ingenweb.org/intippecanoe/spurs.htm> .

⁸⁰ Biographical Record and Portrait Album of Tippecanoe County, Indiana, 1888, pp. 217218; found at <http://ingenweb.org/intippecanoe/spurs.htm> .

⁸¹ Whicker; found at <http://ingenweb.org/intippecanoe/spurs.htm> .

⁸² Biographical Record...; found at <http://ingenweb.org/intippecanoe/spurs.htm> .

⁸³ Whicker; found at <http://ingenweb.org/intippecanoe/spurs.htm> .

⁸⁴ Rich Ferguson, "Spur's Defeat by Shawnee in November 1812," The Discriminating General, 2008; found at The War of 1812 Website, <http://www.warof1812.ca/battles.htm> .

⁸⁵ Whicker; found at <http://ingenweb.org/intippecanoe/spurs.htm> .

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Spencer, Chapter 2; found at <http://files.usgwarchives.net/in/sullivan/history/1884/history/chapteri361gms.txt> .

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Holliday, p. 14.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid., p.17-24. This essay passage is a condensation and paraphrase of the account on these noted pages.)

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 32.

⁹⁵ Winkler, The Thames, p. 21.

⁹⁶ Holliday, pp. 25-26.

⁹⁷ <https://www.mississinewa1812.com/info.htm> .

⁹⁸ Richard Rosevink and David Bennett, Campaigns of the Army of the Northwest 1812-1813: A Brief History, (Defiance, Ohio: Defiance County Chapter of the Ohio Genealogical Society, copyright Richard Rosevink and David Bennett, 2008), p.7.

⁹⁹ Eric E. Johnson, "Battle of the Maumee Rapids," The Lake Erie Ledger, Vol. 30, No. 3, (October 2017). p.4, and Winkler, The Thames, p. 32.

¹⁰⁰ It is difficult to determine exactly how many soldiers Winchester had when he began his descent of the Maumee River. It has been reported that Winchester's column "...consist[ed] of 2,000 untrained regulars and volunteers mostly from Kentucky..." early in the march (perhaps in midSeptember, 1812). The same article states that at the 2nd Battle of Frenchtown, January 22, 1813, the British "...total force numbered over a thousand, perhaps as many as 1,300 compared to Winchester's 934." (Battle of Frenchtown, also known as The Battle of the River Raisin, found at http://riverraisinbattlefield.org/the_battles.htm .) It is known that Winchester's division suffered greatly in its Fall 1812 descent of the Maumee River. Ohio Historical Marker 6-20 states: "During the construction of the Miami and Erie Canal, which

opened in 1845, canal workers dug through the burial grounds of Winchester's Camp No. 3 and uncovered thousands of bones." (Ohio Historical Marker 6-20, St Rt 424, Defiance Ohio: ODNR Independence Dam State Park.) However, it is difficult to imagine that the division suffered to the extent that it lost over 50% of its force to disease and other disablement in this march.

¹⁰¹ Rosevink and Bennett, p. 9.

¹⁰² Winkler, The Thames, p. 32.

¹⁰³ Ohio Historical Marker 3-20, The Bend Road, Defiance Ohio; ODNR Park – The Bend Rd. – Delaware Twp. (7 miles W. of Defiance, S. off St. Rt. 18 of N. off county road 424). Presented courtesy of the Defiance Chapter of the Ohio Genealogical Society, Community of Delaware Township, and the Ohio Historical Society.

¹⁰⁴ Winkler, The Thames, p. 32.

¹⁰⁵ Ohio Historical Marker 3-20.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Howe, Vol. 2, p. 860.

¹⁰⁸ John Merrill, "Skirmish on the Peninsula" First Ohio 1812 Battle. <http://touringohio.com/northwest/ottawa/battlefield-park.html> , p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 4.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 5

¹¹⁴ Eric E. Johnson, "'Ohio's first battle in the War of 1812 occurred at Marblehead Peninsula." The Lake Erie Ledger, Vol. 22, No. 3, (October 2009), p. 21.

¹¹⁵ Howe, Vol. 2, p. 662.

¹¹⁶ Winkler, The Thames, p. 34.

¹¹⁷ Johnson, "Maumee Rapids," p. 4.

¹¹⁸ Winkler, The Thames, p. 14.

¹¹⁹ Johnson, "Maumee Rapids," p. 4.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 5.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Byron Farwell, The Great War in Africa, 1914-1918, (New York: W.W Norton & Company, 1986), p. 14.

¹²⁴ Winkler, The Thames, p. 92.

Essay # 8: The Battle of Mississinewa

A Battle in a Major Western Campaign in the War of 1812

John Eric Vining

1995

Academic position (paraphrased): The Battle of Mississinewa was a battle in an independent war waged by the United States against the Native Americans in the lower Northwest Territory from 1811 to 1813 – a separate war from the British-American “War of 1812” (1812-1815).

John Eric Vining’s position:

The Battle of Mississinewa was a battle in an overall American campaign in Ohio, Indiana Territory, and Illinois Territory in the Fall of 1812, and integral to the British-American “War of 1812” in the Northwestern Theater. It was one of a series of operations intended to stabilize Major General William Henry Harrison’s left flank and protect it from Native American forces that were poised to threaten his northward-oriented supply lines along the Stillwater, St. Mary’s and Auglaize Rivers in West-Central and Northwest Ohio.

On a bright, glistening, crystal-clear day in a bustling Native American village situated on a frozen river, children played with dogs and toys beneath the skeletal sycamore and cottonwood trees as their parents work at various tasks in the village.

Suddenly, from the east, a troop of U.S. Cavalry swoops and storms into the idyllic scene. The cavalry shatters and burns the village, forcing the Indians west to face an uncertain winter without adequate clothing and shelter.

This may sound like something from the Old West – perhaps the Dakotas – circa 1873. Actually, the above action took place in Indiana Territory in 1812! Driving north on Indiana State Route 15, north of Marion, Indiana, you may notice a sign with directions to a historical marker which is located a few miles to the west of the highway. If you make a slight detour to follow those directions, you will come upon the site of the Battle of Mississinewa.

It was November 25, 1812, and the War of 1812 was in full swing. General William Henry Harrison, commander of the U.S. North Western Army, ordered Lieutenant Colonel John B. Campbell to gather a mounted force to destroy the Native American villages on the Mississinewa River. Campbell was to gather his force at Franklinton (Columbus), Ohio, and travel through Springfield, Xenia, and Dayton to Eaton. At Eaton, Campbell was to secure provisions for the final drive to the Mississinewa.

The size of Campbell's mounted troop has been disputed: the estimates range from 600 (the generally accepted total) to 781 soldiers. Campbell himself was a member of the 19th Infantry Regiment, and had a company of the Nineteenth with him. Major James V. Ball was second in command, at the head of the Second Dragoons. Lieutenant Colonel James Simrall and his four troops of Kentucky Dragoons, which had previous experience fighting the Indiana Miamis, were included in the force. Rounding out the mounted force were a militia company of Pennsylvania riflemen, an additional company known as the Pittsburgh Blues (under Captain James Butler), units of Ohio volunteers, and a company of spies and scouts. Lieutenant Colonel Campbell picked up pack horses at Dayton and completed the final assembly of troops at Greenville. After a hard but steady march to the Mississinewa, Campbell's command arrived at the Native American villages early on the morning of December 17th, 1812. (The exact dates are disputed, variously given as the 12th, the 16th, or the 17th, but the date of December 17th seems most accepted.)

Campbell believed he had reached the main Miami village of Silver Heel's Town, but instead, the mounted raiders had first come upon a minor village of the Munsee Indians (a branch of the Delawares). Immediately slashing in to attack, the mounted forces turned the village into a whirlwind of confusion. In a few minutes, the dragoons and mounted militia had killed eight braves and captured eight other braves plus 34 women and children. Despite the rapidity of the attack, some of the Native Americans escaped. The dragoons brought the prisoners back to an area where the infantry was building a fortified encampment, the protected area being roughly five hundred feet square.

After securing the prisoners in the control of the infantry, the mounted troops again loped to the west to attack Silver Heel's Town, approximately two miles further downstream. Finding the village deserted (the escapees had spread word of the attacking U.S. troops); the soldiers burned the town and destroyed all crops and livestock. As the day was growing later, and the dragoons didn't care to be caught in the deep woods in the midwinter gloom, the force headed back to the east to the fortified encampment for the night.

At four the next morning, the drummer sounded reveille. The officers met to determine their next move. Should they advance to the next large Miami village, Mississineway, twenty miles further down the river, or should they seek out the Miamis and Delawares from the destroyed villages who had eluded their net?

As they conferred in the predawn gloom, the shrieks of a combined Miami and Delaware attack broke over them. Although they were not caught completely by surprise, the soldiers were not able to determine exactly from which direction the attack was coming or estimate the size of the attacking force (later determined to be approximately 300 attackers). In a savage, two-hour battle, Campbell's force repelled the attack. With the coming of dawn and an improvement in the gathering light, the fire from the regulars and the Pennsylvania riflemen improved accordingly, and the Indians retreated from the galling fire.

Campbell's men waited for a time, then crept out of their camp to examine the surrounding woods. The evidence they found there led them to estimate that at least 30 to 40 of the enemy had been killed in the attack. Campbell's own losses had been significant. The U.S. force had lost twelve men killed and 48 wounded in the two-day conflict.

The officers once more convened to take stock of their situation. Many of Campbell's men were suffering from frostbite, the wounded had to be tended and transported, and the prisoners had to be guarded. Furthermore, it was unclear whether the Indians were retreating or merely regrouping for a second attack. Intelligence gathered by the spies and scouts indicated there were additional Native American forces in the area, possibly led by the great Shawnee leader, Tecumseh.

The course was now clear. Campbell ordered a withdrawal to Greenville, to begin that afternoon, December 18th. With the burden of prisoners and wounded, and having lost over 100 horses in the campaign, the mounted command did not reach Greenville until Christmas Day, 1812.

General Harrison was pleased with the campaign. In his report of the battle, he issued the following commendation:

"But the character of this gallant detachment exhibiting, as it did perseverance, patience, fortitude and bravery, would however, have been incomplete, if, in the midst of victory, they had forgotten the feelings of humanity. It is with the sincerest pleasure, that the general has heard, that the most punctual obedience was paid to his orders; not only in saving the women and children, but in sparing all the warriors who ceased to resist; and that even, when vigorously attacked by the enemy, the claims of mercy prevailed over every sense of their own danger; and this heroic band respected the lives of their prisoners. The general believes that humanity and true bravery are inseparable. The rigid rules of war may sometimes, indeed, make a severe retaliation necessary; but the advantages which attend a frequent recurrence of it, are very uncertain, and are not to be compared with the blessings which providence cannot fail to shed upon the efforts of the soldier, who is 'in battle a lion, but, the battle once ended, in mercy a lamb.' Let an account of the murdered innocents be opened in the records of Heaven against our enemies alone; the American soldier will follow the example of his government, and neither the sword of the one will be raised against the helpless or the fallen, nor the gold of the other paid for the scalps of a massacred enemy." **Harrison.**¹

Many of the facts of the battle are well established. We can now consider more interesting and debatable questions. Why did a battle of significant magnitude take place between the U.S. Army and the Miami Nation during the War of 1812? Even more interestingly, why did it take place in the middle of the wilderness that was the Indiana Territory at that time – far from even the fringe of European/American civilization?

Background to the Battle.

To really understand the Battle of Mississinewa, we must travel back in time slightly more than one year from December 17th, 1812 – to the time of what many consider the true opening battle of the War of 1812. When we were in school and beginning our studies of American history, most of us were taught that the Battle of Tippecanoe (November 7, 1811) was the engagement that broke the back of Native

American resistance in the Old Northwest Territory. However, I think it is significant that many accounts both then and now indicate it was much less final in its implications. Tecumseh, the prominent Midwestern Native American leader, was in the South at that time attempting to build a large confederation of Indian tribes to oppose white encroachment beyond established treaty lines. Tecumseh knew that by 1800 it was impossible to force the Americans back over the Appalachians. However, he envisioned a great confederacy of Midwestern and Southern Indian nations, concentrated above the various treaty lines in Ohio, Indiana Territory, and Illinois Territory, acting as a buffer state between the Americans in Kentucky and southern Ohio and the British in Canada.

While Tecumseh was in the South, William Henry Harrison, then governor of Indiana Territory, moved north to confront the Native Americans living at the center of the confederacy movement, Prophet's Town, on the Tippecanoe River in west-central Indiana. Tecumseh's brother, Tenskwatawa (also known as "The Prophet") led a group of combined tribes against Harrison's army in a surprise pre-dawn attack. Harrison's forces repelled the attack with significant losses to themselves (38 killed, 150 wounded). Thus, Tecumseh's dream of building a buffer state of Native American nations was destroyed by the defeat of the fledgling confederacy which was assembled at Prophet's Town.

There are two points of significance in evaluating this battle. First, in the passing of time, the legend has grown that Tippecanoe was the battle that crushed the Indian war movement in the Old Northwest. In reality, it only broke the Native Americans' ability to *win* the war, not to contest it strenuously. In this sense, it is much like the Battle of Midway in the Pacific Theater of World War II. Midway ended any hope of Japan conducting a negotiated peace and retaining possession of the substantial territorial gains it had acquired during the early phases of the war. However, Japan still possessed great forces which enabled it to continue the war for three more years, without a true hope for ultimate victory.

Tippecanoe was the "Native Americans' Midway" in the Old Northwest. The Indians still possessed enough manpower to strongly contest the increasing numbers of white settlers flooding into the Northwest Territories, but they no longer had a realistic chance of a negotiated peace as a buffer state between the Americans and the British. The only realistic possibility was an alliance with the British in the War of 1812.

Second, the Battle of Tippecanoe was far less "crushing" in the Americans' own eyes at that time than it now seems from our vantage point of history. Harrison held his lines for 36 hours after the battle, breathlessly awaiting a massive frontal attack that never came. Only after a day and a half did his men advance from their protected positions to find that the Indians had gone. The Indians must still have represented a significant offensive force in Harrison's mind as he left the Tippecanoe battle scene. Events in the War of 1812 would seem to validate Harrison's mindset.

The War of 1812 was declared by Congress on June 18th, 1812. One of the United States' goals was to invade and capture Canadian territory with a three-pronged attack. An eastern offensive was to be

launched from the Lake Champlain area. In November, under the command of General Henry Dearborn, a drive was started from Plattsburg, New York, toward Montreal. This offensive failed when the New York militia refused to leave United States soil.

Another American attempt to invade Canada occurred along the Niagara River on October 13th, 1812. General Isaac Brock, the commander of the British forces in the area, had about 1,200 soldiers along the Niagara River. The Americans, under Generals Stephen Van Rensselaer and Alexander Smyth, had about 6,000 troops. During two attempts to cross the river and occupy Canada's Queenston Heights, the Americans achieved limited initial successes, but in each case those soldiers that crossed the river were counterattacked and either killed or captured. The Battle of Queenston Heights ended the second American attempt to invade Canada in 1812.

The third, western-most prong was to be launched from Detroit. Accordingly, General William Hull, governor of Michigan Territory, gathered a force and moved from Urbana in Ohio to Detroit to conduct the attack. Hull's position at Detroit was hopeless from the start. Quickly flanked and cut off from supplies, Hull was forced to surrender to the British on August 16th, 1812, with his entire army. One of the major reasons for Hull's defeat was Tecumseh, now a brigadier general in the British army, at the head of a powerful Native American force.

The fall of Detroit signaled the start of a series of sharp Indian raids in mid-1812. Almost simultaneously with the fall of Detroit, Fort Dearborn (Chicago) fell to Indian attackers. A series of well coordinated attacks took place in September – all bearing Tecumseh's "signature" as overall mastermind. The attacks included Pigeon's Roost (September 3), Fort Harrison (September 4), Fort Madison (September 5), and Fort Wayne (September 6).

The most serious was the attack on Fort Wayne. With the fall of Detroit and Fort Dearborn, Fort Wayne now became the U.S.'s northwestern-most outpost by far, and as such was very vulnerable to attack. For seven days, Native Americans laid siege to the small garrison. William Henry Harrison, recently named commander of the North Western Army, marched from the headwaters of the St. Marys River to relieve the besieged bastion. As holder of dual commissions (brigadier general in the United States Army and brevet major general of the Kentucky militia), he ordered General James Winchester's 1,500-man strong army of Kentuckians (originally assembled to relieve Hull at Detroit) to rendezvous with him at Fort Wayne. The Indians lifted the siege at the approach of General Harrison's army. After Winchester arrived, Harrison ordered him to move down the Maumee River and recapture Detroit.

Harrison now had an army in the field, headed for Detroit. His new problem was how to supply this force from his main commissaries at Cincinnati, Greenville, and Piqua. In examining the map, we see that he chose to construct a series of forts, each built one travel-day apart, running from Piqua in the south to Fort Meigs at the Maumee Rapids. These forts guarded the lines of communication and supply, and eventually the forts became the lifeline of the army operating in the Northwest.

A closer examination of a topical map shows what Harrison almost certainly must have seen as he pondered his strategic situation: a series of rivers running from southeast to northwest, all located just to the west of his line of new forts. The St. Marys, the Wabash, the Salamonie, and the Mississinewa Rivers pointed like arrows at his lower bases at Greenville, Piqua, Fort Loramie, and Fort Barbee (present-day St. Marys, Ohio). Even Fort Amanda on the upper reaches of the Auglaize River could not be considered safe from these avenues of attack. More ominously, situated on the lower reaches of the Mississinewa was the largest concentration of Native American villages in Indiana Territory, including Silver Heel's Town. Many of the inhabitants of these villages were thought to have participated in the September raids on Fort Harrison and Fort Wayne.

Given the sequence of events just related – the uncertainty of final victory at Tippecanoe, the fall of Detroit and Fort Dearborn to “British Indians,” the sharp September raids, and the siege of Fort Wayne, William Henry Harrison almost certainly had to be asking himself the following questions: Where exactly was Tecumseh? How many warriors did he have? Where could Tecumseh strike to cause maximum damage, and which avenues could he use to make these attacks? What area could support a large number of warriors through the cold, dark winter months? Harrison, possessing a sharp military mind from his youthful study of strategy and tactics, was almost certainly aware of the old military axiom: *“Never march parallel to a strong enemy force on one's flank.”*

William Henry Harrison certainly recognized the strategic importance of this Native American concentration in Indiana Territory. Robert Breckinridge McAfee quoted Harrison's rationale for the December, 1812 raid on the Mississinewa villages, in Harrison's own words:

“The situation of this town, as it regards one line of operations...would render a measure of this kind highly proper...the Indians...will direct all their efforts against fort Wayne, and the convoys which are to follow the left wing of the army. Mississiniway will be their rendezvous, where they will receive provisions and every assistance they may require for any hostile enterprise. From that place they can by their runners ascertain the period, at which every convoy may set out from St. Marys, and with certainty intercept it on its way to the Miami Rapids.” (I.e.: the Maumee Rapids – Author's note.) *“But that place being broken up, and the provisions destroyed, there will be nothing to subsist any body of Indians, nearer than the Potawatamie towns on the waters of the St. Josephs of the Lake.”* **Harrison.**²

Thus, the raid which developed into the Battle of Mississinewa was born of sound strategic thinking on the part of General William Henry Harrison. The elimination of a potential enemy force on his western periphery secured his left flank well into 1813. Harrison certainly must have believed that Winchester's army would have recaptured Detroit well before the Miami/Shawnee Confederation forces could recover from the Mississinewa destruction. The campaign that would lead to the River Raisin massacre of Winchester's army was in place. Due to Winchester's defeat at Frenchtown (River Raisin), Harrison would have to remount his campaign against Detroit in 1813.


The Commanders' Subsequent Lives.

What became of the protagonists in this battle? Certainly at least partially due to Harrison's commendation for his execution of the Mississinewa raid, John B. Campbell obtained a brevet promotion to colonel. By 1814, Campbell had been promoted once again and was colonel and commander of the 11th Infantry Regiment on the north-central theater of the Canadian front. To retaliate for British destruction of Buffalo, New York, the previous winter, and perhaps forgetting the nature of the commendation for his conduct of the Battle of Mississinewa, Campbell loaded his command into boats, crossed Lake Erie, and destroyed Port Dover. His actions in destroying private property were censured by his own men, and he was reprimanded by the United States government. However, he was back in command of the 11th Infantry Regiment in July, 1814, and was badly wounded in the Battle of Chippewa on July 5th, 1814. Never fully recovering, Colonel John B. Campbell died on August 28th, 1814.

William Henry Harrison went on to fame as the eventual victor in the Northwestern Theater of the War of 1812, and he used this fame to become the ninth President of the United States. His organizational skills and supply efforts bulwarked the United States' defense of the Old Northwest in 1813, and were rewarded when Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry defeated the British fleet in the naval Battle of Lake Erie (also known as the Battle of Put-In-Bay). Quickly switching from the defensive to the offensive mode of operation and using Perry's warships as troop transports, Harrison crossed Lake Erie and pursued the fleeing British into Canada. (The British General Procter had been compelled to abandon Detroit after it became untenable with the loss of British control of Lake Erie.) Harrison caught Procter at Moraviantown and defeated his forces in the Battle of the Thames River, ending the British threat to the Old Northwest. One of Harrison's adversaries in the Battle of the Thames was Tecumseh.

Tecumseh became a true "swords and roses" figure of the American West. After failing to dislodge the Americans from their western settlements and strong points, Tecumseh strengthened Native American forces at Detroit to fight beside the British. He participated in a series of unsuccessful offensives against the U.S.'s northern fortifications during 1813. After the British loss in the Battle of Lake Erie, Tecumseh reluctantly followed General Procter in his tactical retreat into Canada. Run down by his nemesis, General Harrison, at Moraviantown on the Thames River, Tecumseh commanded the British right flank in the ensuing battle. As the British left and center broke and began streaming backward, Tecumseh, on the right, held. Tecumseh led his warriors and fought bravely until killed at the height of the battle, forever passing into the pantheon of American legends as one of the greatest Native American leaders.

The Battle of Mississinewa – an almost forgotten footnote in an ultimately unsuccessful campaign in a little-known war. Yet, for students of military history, the battle provides an opportunity to study a major operational theater of a Nineteenth Century war. It also provides an opportunity to study the tactics of a commander who was successful in the field – Campbell; the strategies of a commander who would someday be the leader of his country – Harrison; and the politics of a leader who dreamed of becoming the father of his country – Tecumseh.



The Battle of Mississinewa, December 18, 1812: The Indians overran Captain Pierce's detached sentry post off the northwest corner of American encampment, then assailed the northwest corner and west side of the camp proper. The Native Americans were thrown back with severe losses by reinforcements from other not-attacked areas of the encampment on the south and east perimeters. (Map courtesy of Alan J. Vining and Teresa J. Vining)

Endnotes

¹ Robert Breckinridge McAfee, History of the Late War in the Western Country (Lexington, KY: Worsley & Smith, 1816. Reproduced by Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, Inc., 1966), pp. 181-182.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178.

Essay # 9: The War of 1812 Service of Major General John E. Wool 1784-1869

John Eric Vining

2018 Revision

Who laments for the second-in-command? For generations, Winfield Scott has been immortalized as one of the greatest generals this country ever produced. Yet, John Ellis Wool was an almost exact contemporary of Winfield Scott. Like Scott, Wool emerged from the War of 1812 a national hero, struggled in battles with Native Americans on the U. S. frontiers, held command of large units in the Mexican War, and remained a general officer through the first years of the Civil War. Unlike Scott, who is enshrined in the minds of military historians as an American icon, Wool has been forgotten to the extent that his name does not even warrant an entry in many encyclopedias and histories. Perhaps because Wool, though a “spitand-polish,” by-the-book professional through and through, leavened his various commands with compassion at appropriate times, his star faded in comparison to other possibly more successful generals. John E. Wool was born February 29, 1784, in Troy, New York, and pursued several occupations until the outbreak of the War of 1812. As he was pursuing his civilian careers, he began fulfilling his civic duties by joining the Troy “Invincibles,” a local militia unit, in 1808. He was designated the color bearer in this unit. As war with Great Britain loomed, he applied for a position in the larger Rensselaer, New York militia brigade, and on April 1, 1809, was elected ensign and quartermaster of cavalry.¹

With war imminent, Ensign Wool applied for a regular army commission, and on April 14, 1812, he was appointed captain in the 13th Infantry Regiment, U.S Army.² On June 18, 1812, the United States declared war on Great Britain over the impressment of American sailors on the high seas and British interference with American affairs in the Northwest Territory. Shortly thereafter, Republican New York Governor Daniel D. Tompkins called the state militia to active service and forwarded it to positions along New York’s northern and western boundaries.³

While the bulk of the regulars and militia underwent active deployment, Captain Wool remained in Troy and recruited soldiers for his company, a component of the rapidly expanding United States military force. By early September he met his quota, and traveled with his company to the army camp at Greenbush, opposite Albany, New York.⁴ This cantonment, spread over 260 acres, was designed to accommodate 5,000 soldiers. It also served as a training and supply base for soldiers being deployed to the north and west. The late summer of 1812 was cool and wet, and the camp area was a vast sea of mud. This led to the outbreak of various diseases, including the soldiers’ scourge of the time, dysentery. Nevertheless, Captain Wool drilled his men and prepared them for battle as a part of Colonel Peter P. Schuyler’s 13th Infantry Regiment. On September 18th, 1812, the 13th Regiment left Greenbush for the Niagara frontier.⁵

The regiment moved steadily westward to Onondaga, New York, where Colonel Schuyler received orders to send part of his force north to Oswego, on Lake Ontario. Captain John E. Wool volunteered his company to be a part of this five-company force, to be commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Chrystie. Chrystie marched this unit north in early October, while Schuyler continued to the west with the remainder of the regiment. Thirty-nine munition-laden boats awaited Chrystie's detachment at Oswego; the unit boarded them and paddled toward Fort Niagara. The detachment reached Four Mile Creek, a few miles east of Fort Niagara, on October 9 and the unit unloaded the boats there.⁶

On October 12th, Chrystie led the three hundred regulars of his detachment on a rain-chilled night march to the Lewiston ferry. At that point, an equal number of militia and perhaps thirteen boats under Colonel Solomon Van Rensselaer, chief aide to army commander Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer, awaited them. The combined unit's mission was to cross the Niagara River, ascend Queenston Heights immediately adjacent to the river, capture a redoubt containing one 18-pounder cannon located halfway up the Heights, then march east through Queenston to attack Fort George, directly across the river from Fort Niagara. Regular Army Brigadier General Alexander Smyth was to lead a supporting force from Buffalo, New York in coordination with this attack. At 4 AM, October 13, 1812, the combined units began the waterborne assault on Queenston Heights, the U.S. Regulars in the lead boats.⁷

Immediately, there were complications with the amphibious assault. The crossing had been planned for a point where the Niagara River was between 600⁸ and 750⁹ feet across, but dangerous eddies at this point made the crossing a treacherous task. It had been estimated that there needed to be a minimum of 30 boats, each carrying 20 men apiece, to successfully ferry the estimated 4,000-man assault force across the river in a reasonable amount of time¹⁰. But at the time of the attack there were only 12¹¹ or 13¹² available. Therefore, the American troops would have to cross the river in shifts, the boats crisscrossing the river to deliver the force in total. An additional complication was that the boats were too small to transport any of the Americans' artillery across the river in support of the assault.¹³

The Americans crossed the river in a rainstorm, braving the twin onslaughts of the eddies and the downpour. British resistance to the landing and assault on the heights was fierce, with many of the American senior commanders receiving incapacitating wounds¹⁴ or being killed fairly early in the assault. The maelstrom that was the Niagara River caused the militia and the regulars to struggle ashore at different points along the river.¹⁵ Meanwhile, the British 49th Regiment of Foot plus Royal militia from York and Lincoln counties strenuously resisted the American amphibious assault, while the Royal artillery played havoc with the boats on the river.¹⁶

While the boats plied the river bringing up American reinforcements, Captain Wool learned that Lt. Colonel Chrystie's boat had drifted from the landing site and Chrystie was temporarily lost. As senior captain on shore, 25-year-old John E. Wool assumed command of the regulars. Quickly organizing the Americans, he broke British resistance to the landing force and secured the beachhead.¹⁷ He then formed

his troops into a skirmish line on open ground in preparation for a forward movement. However, a wounded and immobile Van Rensselaer issued counter-orders, directing both regulars and militia to seek cover under the riverbank. In the gathering light of dawn, an impatient John Wool made repeated requests to lead an assault on the redoubt containing the 18-pounder cannon which loomed directly above the huddled American assault troops. Finally, Van Rensselaer consented to the request and ordered the ascent. Wool collected 240 soldiers¹⁸ and headed west, his troops shielded by the riverbank, to the base of a steep upward-leading fisherman's path that the British, believing it to be impassible, had left unguarded. Laboriously climbing the path by grasping rocks and bushes,¹⁹ Wool's troops emerged above and behind the redoubt and immediately fired down into it, scattering the defending British and sending them east, down the Heights.²⁰

Captain Wool quickly deployed his troops to defend the redoubt against British counterattacks. He found that before they retreated, the British had spiked the cannon, rendering it temporarily useless to the Americans. He also noted that the British, under their commander, General Isaac Brock, were rapidly reforming for a counterattack on the redoubt. During this effort, British General Brock was killed; American Captain Wool also received a significant wound, yet remained at his post and retained local command. Wool's troops defended the redoubt against the now relatively weak-spirited British counterattack. He then gathered the wounded soldiers and the British prisoners apprehended during the assault and sent them to the rear area. By this time, it was between three and four o'clock in the afternoon; Lt. Colonel Chrystie arrived and assumed command of Wool's troops.²¹ Having been relieved of command, Wool had his wounds dressed, and at the command of Lt. Colonel Chrystie, he was ordered across the river to Lewiston.²²

Later, the day went against the Americans and a significant portion of the assaulting troops were forced to surrender. None of this was any reflection of the actions of Captain John Wool at the battle. In the aftermath of the debacle that was named the Battle of Queenston Heights, Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer asked to be relieved of command of the army. However, before relinquishing command, he forwarded a list of officers whom he considered to have distinguished themselves at the battle. On October 16th, 1812, Captain John E. Wool learned that his name was included on that list.²³

After he had recuperated from his wounds in January 1813, Captain Wool was posted to Troy, New York, and again tasked with recruiting his company back to operational strength.²⁴ By mid-March, he had succeeded in building his company to the required strength of 100 men.²⁵

Wool and his company were forwarded to Utica, New York, and in April 1813, Wool received notice that he had been promoted to major in the regular U.S. Army. He was also reassigned to the 29th Infantry Regiment. As the 29th was currently in organizational status and Wool desired an active command, he asked for and received a temporary posting to the 23rd Infantry Regiment on the Niagara Front.²⁶

Unfortunately, the 23rd saw little active service during his time with that unit. In August, he was ordered to rejoin the 29th Regiment, then at Burlington, Vermont under the command of Major General Wade Hampton.²⁷ There, Wool was placed in command of a mixed regular and militia infantry battalion. On September 19th, Hampton's army crossed Lake Champlain to Plattsburg, New York. From that point, the army moved up the Chazy River and across the Canadian border to Odletown, Lower Canada. However, a scarcity of water forced Hampton to retire back across the St. Lawrence River to the village of Champlain. From there, Major Wool and Colonel Josiah Snelling conducted mounted raids on enemy outposts.²⁸

On October 21, 1813, Hampton's command marched up the Chateaugay River. After a four-day advance, his leading elements encountered British pickets, indicating that a large British force was near. Hampton sent a brigade in a flanking march in an attempt to strike the enemy's rear echelon, while his second-in-command, Brigadier General George Izard, prepared Snelling's and Wool's battalions for a simultaneous frontal assault. The British force engaged in a ruse, giving shouted orders, blowing bugles, and generally creating the impression that reinforcements were arriving. The American army reacted with growing panic, and its commanding officer, Hampton, got caught up in his soldiers' alarm. He gave orders to retreat; the flanking brigade found itself unsupported, and the entire American force withdrew in confusion. "The battle," a frank Major Wool later related, "was from its inception to its termination a disgrace" to the United States army. No officer who had "any regard for his own reputation, would voluntarily acknowledge himself as being engaged in it."²⁹ The debacle led to General Hampton's resignation and in November 1813, Major General James Wilkinson took over command of the army at French Creek in northern New York.³⁰

In February 1814, General Wilkinson attached Major John E. Wool to his staff. General Wilkinson was subject to much criticism both during his lifetime and by subsequent historians, but John E. Wool was not one of these critics. While he stated that Wilkinson's character was the most "equivocal" of any man he ever knew, he felt his military judgement and activity "was never effaced." To his many critics in the army and in Congress, Wilkinson defended himself "with great address and greater craft." Ever the frank commentator, Wool believed "...the charge of intoxication on which with several other charges he was subsequently brought to trial, was unjust, for although his habits were convivial, he...[was] never incapable of business and...his industry was indefatigable. His manners were vivacious, and in all the ordinary details of his office he was apt and adroit."³¹

On March 30th Wilkinson's army, comprised of 2,000 soldiers and with Major Wool serving as an aide-de-camp, marched from Plattsburg, New York to Odletown, Lower Canada. Wilkinson attacked a numerically inferior British force at La Colla Creek, but his assault was unsuccessful. He retreated back into New York on April 1st, and shortly thereafter was ordered to relinquish his command to General George Izard.³² The American army then fell back once again to Plattsburg.

In the summer of 1814, John Wool and other mid-level officers of the northeastern army supervised the building of fortifications in the Plattsburg environs while simultaneously drilling newly recruited, and hence untrained, regulars there. General Izard received intelligence indicating that the British were assembling an army at Odletown. There could be only one use for these troops – a British invasion of northern New York, southward down the Lake Champlain corridor. Izard theorized that a feint to the west along the upper Saint Lawrence River might distract the British and perhaps forestall an invasion. He petitioned the War Department for authorization to detach a force to Sackett's Harbor and employ it there to menace the St. Lawrence. He was granted permission to do so and on August 29th, 1814 he personally accompanied a 4,000-man force on this mission. He asked the governors of Vermont and New York to send state militia to Plattsburg as reinforcements to replace his departing army. Brigadier General Alexander Macomb retained 3,000 regulars – including Major Wool and his command – at Plattsburg and awaited the arrival of the militia reinforcements.³³

The canny British commander at Odletown, Sir George Prevost, did not fall for Izard's ruse. When his scouts reported the departure of Izard's army for western New York, Prevost immediately set in motion his invasion of northern New York. American General Macomb's scouts observed and reported the British movement, and early on September 5th Macomb ordered New York State militia General Benjamin Mooers to Beekmantown, on the perceived invasion route, to interdict the British advance. Hard on Mooers' heels, Macomb ordered Major Wool and 250 (or perhaps 280³⁴; accounts vary) regulars to support Mooers' militia at Beekmantown.³⁵

The British marched on Beekmantown in two columns. Upon his arrival at the front on September 6th, Wool quickly sized up the tactical situation and destroyed a nearby bridge, thereby slowing and funneling the British advance toward his smaller force. He then deployed his regulars on the remaining road, posting militia on either flank. At Wool's command, the militia delivered one volley, then ran – the regulars also retreating at a measured pace shortly thereafter. Wool's force fell back four miles to Culver's Hill and reformed (Wool shouting to his officers, "Shoot the first man that attempts to run, or I will shoot you!"), while the British continued their now single-road advance in a compact column. Wool ordered his platoons into successive lines, the front-rank kneeling to shoot, then falling back as the next line knelt and shot – thus keeping nearly continuous rounds of volley fire on the head of the British column. At 8 o'clock AM, Wool pulled his force back to Halsey's Corners, where two cannons awaited to support him. Wool placed the cannons together in the road, masked them with infantry, and once again waited for the slowermoving British to reach his position. When the advancing British came within range, Wool's infantry parted before the cannons and the artillery roared, staggering the head of the British column and once again stalling the British advance for a significant amount of time. The Americans then retreated through Plattsburg, across the Saranac River, and reached safety in American lines.³⁶

Later, General Prevost brought up the remainder of his infantry and heavy artillery, then awaited the arrival of the British fleet on Lake Champlain. Upon that fleet's arrival, Prevost mounted a simultaneous attack on the American lines. However, the lake battle went against the British and Prevost, his left flank now imperiled by the victorious American fleet on the lake, withdrew north to Canada. The twin victories at the Battle of Plattsburg and the Battle of Lake Champlain thwarted the British northeastern invasion of 1814.³⁷

Both General Mooers and Major Wool believed that Wool's attacks at the Battle of Plattsburg were decisive actions. Mooers stated thus in his battle report, and Wool commented: "... If I had not gone out... and contested... for more than seven miles an advance of 4000 men marching on Plattsburgh on the morning of the 6th of Sept., Sir George Prevost... would have succeeded in capturing our forts and batteries. Had he done so McDonough would have been compelled to have changed his position. Instead of remaining under our batteries, he would have been driven into the broad lake. Prevost should have followed my troops across the Saranac... on the morning of the sixth. By postponing his attack until the 11th of September, he lost every thing."³⁸

Wool and his unit successfully ambushed a 12,000-man British army wing invading Plattsburg, New York, from Canada. Wool's unit significantly slowed the advance³⁹ and inflicted numerous casualties on the column, materially aiding the American victory in the Battles of Plattsburg/Lake Champlain. For his contributions in assisting in the defeat of an invasion that Winston Churchill would later call "the most decisive engagement of the war,"⁴⁰ on January 14, 1815, Wool was promoted to the brevet rank of lieutenant colonel.⁴¹

John Ellis Wool emerged from the War of 1812 as one of perhaps five officers to achieve public acclimation for his performance in that war (the others being Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, Jacob Brown, and Winfield Scott). Wool retired from active service on August 1st, 1863.⁴² He was the oldest officer to have executed active command in the army at the time.⁴³ Wool had served his country as an officer in its armed forces for 51 years, including 37 as a general. Proving tough to the end, John E. Wool survived another six years, dying on November 10, 1869.⁴⁴ He was born shortly after his country's birth, defended it in three major wars and several frontier struggles, lived to see it divided and then reunited, and lived nearly long enough to see it reconstructed. He made a significant contribution to his country's defense at a time when its military was unappreciated, its officers slowly promoted, and its entire force underpaid. Hopefully, General John Ellis Wool's contributions to our nation's history and well-being will be unappreciated no longer.

¹ Troy Daily Times, November 10, 1869; Hugh Hastings, comp. Public Papers of Daniel D. Thompson, Governor of New York, 1807-1817. Military (New York, 1898), 1:209, 213; Northern Budget, December 5, 1809; Troy Gazette, October 3, 1809; Arthur J. Weise, History of the City of Troy, (Troy, 1876), 85-89. Found in Harwood Perry Hinton. "The Military Career of John Ellis Wool, 1812-1863." Diss. Univ. of Wisconsin, 1960. p. 10. (Cited hereafter as "Hinton").

² Hugh Hastings, ed., Military Minutes of the Council of Appointment of the State of New York, 1783-1821 (Albany, 1901), 2:1268; Thomas H.S. Hammersley, Complete Army and Navy Register (New York, 1888), 878. Found in Hinton, p. 12.

³ Troy Daily Post (Troy, New York), October 2, 1812; Niles' Weekly Register 2:130, 3 51 (April 25, July 25, 1812); Henry Adams, History of the United States, 6:289-299 (New York, 1911). Found in Hinton, p. 13.

⁴ Troy Daily Times, November 10, 1869; Emory Upton, Military Policy of the United States (Washington, 1904), 95. Found in Hinton, p. 14.

⁵ James Mann, Medical Sketches of the Campaigns of 1812, 13, 14 (Dedham, Massachusetts, 1816), 11-14; "Letter for the Secretary of War...Transmitting a List of all the Lands and Buildings...Purchased...for Military Purposes," February 1, 1821, House Executive Document (cited hereafter as HED), No. 83, 16 Cong., 2 sess., Chart No. 4 (Serial 53). See also Nathaniel B. Sylvester, History of Rensselaer County (Philadelphia, 1886), 358; The War, 1:62 (September 26, 1812). Found in Hinton, p. 14.

⁶ "A Hero of Fort Erie. Correspondence of Lieutenant Patrick McDonogh," [sp.] in Publications of the Buffalo Historical Society (cited hereafter as PBHS), 5:71-74 (Buffalo, 1902); Thurlow Weed, Autobiography of Thurlow Weed, edited by Harriet A. Weed (Boston, 1883), 1:24; Knoxville Register (Knoxville, Tennessee), October 4, 1837; Lieutenant Colonel John Chrystie to General Thomas H. Cushing, February 22, 1813, in John Armstrong, Notices of the War of 1812 (New York, 1840), 1:95-96. Found in Hinton, p. 15.

⁷ Van Rensselaer to General Henry Dearborn, October 14, 1812, in The War, 1:83 (October 31, 1812); Niles' Register, 3:169 (November 14, 1812); Chrystie to Cushing, February 22, 1813, in Armstrong, Notices, 1:96-97; Knoxville Register, October 4, 1837. Found in Hinton, p. 17.

⁸ Van Rensselaer to Dearborn, October 14, 1812, in The War, 1:84; Niles' Register, 3:169; Knoxville Register, October 4, 1837; Wool to Colonel William L. Stone, September 12, 1838, John E. Wool Papers, New York Public Library, New York (cited hereafter as NYP). See Also Ernest Cruikshank, ed., The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier in the Year 1812 (Welland, Ontario, 1899). Found in Hinton, p. 18.

⁹ Chuck Lyons, "Disaster at Queenston Heights." Military Heritage, 10, No. 3 (Winter 2008), 43.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Van Rensselaer to General Henry Dearborn, October 14, 1812, in The War, 1:83 (October 31, 1812); Niles' Register, 3:169 (November 14, 1812); Chrystie to Cushing, February 22, 1813, in Armstrong, Notices, 1:96-97; Knoxville Register, October 4, 1837. Found in Hinton, p. 17. ¹³ Lyons, p. 43.

¹⁴ David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler. Eds., Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1997), s.v. "Queenston Heights, Battle of," by Heidler and Heidler, p. 438.

¹⁵ Van Rensselaer to Dearborn, October 14, 1812, in The War, 1:84; Niles' Register, 3:169; Knoxville Register, October 4, 1837; Wool to Colonel William L. Stone, September 12, 1838, John E. Wool Papers, New York Public Library, New York (cited hereafter as NYP). See Also Ernest Cruikshank, ed., The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier in the Year 1812 (Welland, Ontario, 1899). Found in Hinton, p. 18.

¹⁶ Lyons, p. 43.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Van Rensselaer to Dearborn, October 14, 1812, in The War, 1:84; Niles' Register, 3:169; Knoxville Register, October 4, 1837; Wool to Colonel William L. Stone, September 12, 1838, John E. Wool Papers, New York Public Library, New York (cited hereafter as NYP). See Also Ernest Cruikshank, ed., The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier in the Year 1812 (Welland, Ontario, 1899). Found in Hinton, p. 18.

¹⁹ Lyons, p. 43.

²⁰ Van Rensselaer to Dearborn, October 14, 1812, in The War, 1:84; Niles' Register, 3:169; Knoxville Register, October 4, 1837; Wool to Colonel William L. Stone, September 12, 1838, John E. Wool Papers, New York Public Library, New York (cited hereafter as NYP). See Also Ernest Cruikshank, ed., The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier in the Year 1812 (Welland, Ontario, 1899). Found in Hinton, p. 18-19.

²¹ Wool to Col. Van Rensselaer, October, 1812, in Solomon Van Rensselaer, A Narrative of the Affair of Queenstown (New York, 1836), 14-15. Found in Hinton, p. 19.

²² Albany Argus, April 13, 1813; Van Rensselaer to Brigadier General Alexander Smyth, October 24, 1813, in Niles' Register, 3:91 (October 10, 1812). Found in Hinton, p. 20.

²³ Ibid., p. 21.

²⁴ The War, 1:137-138 (February 2, 1813), printed recruiting instructions, dated January 15, 1813, Adjutant General's Office. For Wool's activities see Farmers' Register (Troy, New York), March 2, 1813. Found in Hinton, p. 25.

²⁵ Niles' Register, 4:29 (March 13, 1813). Found in Hinton, p. 26.

²⁶ "War of 1812," Box 3, John E. Wool Papers, New York State Library, Albany (cited hereafter as JEW); Wool to Secretary of War John Armstrong, May 18, 1813, Adjutant General's Office, Letters Received (cited hereafter as AGLR). See also Wool to Jonathan Fish, May 18, 1813, Miscellaneous

Documents, Manuscripts Department, New York State Library, Albany (cited hereafter as NYSL); Adjutant General to Wool, May 26, 1813, Adjutant General's Office, Letters Sent (cited hereafter as AGLS). Found in Hinton, p. 27.

²⁷ "War of 1812," JEW, Box 3; Wool to William Simmons, Accountant of the War Department, July 2, 1813, War of 1812 Manuscripts, Indiana University, Bloomington; The War, 2:34 (August 10, 1813); Mann, Medical Sketches, 91: Adjutant General to Wool, July 31, 1813, AGLS; Adams, History of the United States, 7:147-160. Found in Hinton, p. 28.

²⁸ "War of 1812," JEW, Box 3; Adjutant William King to Armstrong, October 28, 1813, in Armstrong, Notices, 2:190-191; Major General Wade Hampton to Armstrong, Notices, October 4, 1813, in The War, 2:178 (April 5, 1814). Found in Hinton, p. 29-30.

²⁹ King to Armstrong, October 28, 1813, in Armstrong, Notices, 2:192; The War, 2:102 (December 7, 1813); Robert Christie, The Military and Naval Operations in the Canadas...from the Year 1807 Until the Year 1815 (Quebec, 1818); 145-146; Wools to Dawson, March 28, 1860, Wool Papers, NYHS. Found in Hinton, p. 30-31.

³⁰ King to Armstrong, October 28, 1813, Armstrong, Notices, 2:192; Hampton to Wilkinson, November 8, 1813, in The War, 2:100 (November 30, 1813); Albany Argus, November 19, 1813. Found in Hinton, p. 31.

³¹ "War of 1812," JEW, Box 3. Found in Hinton, p. 31-32.

³² Peter S. Palmer, History of Lake Champlain (Plattsburg, 1853), 179-180. Found in Hinton, p. 32.

³³ Brigadier General George Izard to Armstrong, May 7, June 10, August 2, 23, 1814, in George Izard, Official Correspondence...Relative to the Military Operations...of Major General Izard... (Philadelphia, 1816), 2, 26, 61, 67; Armstrong to Izard, August 10, 1814; *ibid.*, 72-74; Niles' Register, 4:387 (August 14, 1814); Adams, History of the United States, 8:91-100. Found in Hinton, p. 33.

³⁴ David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, eds., Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1997), s.v. "Wool, John Ellis," by Robert Saunders, Jr., p. 561.

³⁵ Wool to Henry Dawson, March 28, 1860, Wool Papers, New-York Historical Society, New York (hereafter cited as NYHS.); Plattsburgh Republican, January 15, 1866; Brigadier General Alexander Macomb to Armstrong, September 15, 1814, in The War, 3:55 (February 24, 1814). Found in Hinton, p. 33.

³⁶ Wool to Dawson, March 28, 1860, Wool Papers, NYHS; Plattsburgh Republican, January 15, 1866. For accounts of Wool's retreat, see: N. Ranney in the Weekly American Banner (Yazoo, Mississippi), August 28, 1857; St. John B.L. Skinner in Amasa Moore, An Address on the Battle of Plattsburgh (Plattsburgh, 1844); and Nicholas Stoner in Jephtha R. Simms, Trappers of New York, or a Biography of Nicholas Stoner and Nathaniel Foster (Albany, 1851), 99-109. Found in Hinton, p. 34-35.

³⁷ Wool to Dawson, March 28, 1860, Wool Papers, NYHS; Macomb to Armstrong, September 15, 1814, in The War, 3:55; and Adams, History of the United States, 8:103-111. Found in Hinton, p. 35-36.

- ³⁸ Wool to Dawson, January 17, 1860, Wool Papers, NYHS.
- ³⁹ Heidler and Heidler, eds., s.v. "Wool, John Ellis," by Saunders, p. 562.
- ⁴⁰ David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, eds., Encyclopedia of the War of 1812 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1997), s.v. "Plattsburg, Battle of," by John M. Keefe, p. 420.
- ⁴¹ Macomb to Wool, January 14, 1815, JEW, Box 3. Found in Hinton, p. 36.
- ⁴² "John E. Wool," http://fortwiki.com/John_E._Wool, Page 2/4.
- ⁴³ Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid.